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Abstract 
National governments confront different challenges to the goal of creating model 
citizens, as well as different ambitions in the type of citizen that they wish to create. The United 
States government faces a tension in determining the role of education in shaping the social 
order. As a liberal democracy that extols the virtue of individual liberty, the United States 
should allow educational pluralism to flourish. Paradoxically, however, a nation of immigrants 
might require an education system that turns students into “proper Americans” who honor the 
precepts of liberty, equality, and self-government. I draw from domestic and international 
studies to inform some of the drawbacks, strengths, and limitations of homogenizing 
centralized education versus decentralized pluralistic education.  
The chapters that follow feature studies from regions in which a majority ascribes to a 
different Abrahamic religion: The United States, the Arab World, and Israel. In chapter one, I 
empirically examine whether non-government (i.e. private) schools undermine American civic 
health. Specifically, I examine how attending private school affects American voting behavior. I 
observe that private schooling has no association with the likelihood of voting, but that each 
additional year of private schooling is associated with a decreased likelihood of supporting 
Donald Trump in the 2016 election. In chapter two, I examine the root cause of low private 
returns to education in the Arab World, where education is highly centralized. I find suggestive 
evidence that common characteristics of Arab world political economy, including poor 
academic performance, economic reliance on natural resources, and corruption suppress 
private returns to education. I hypothesize that low returns to education might contribute to 
frequent waves of social unrest and upheaval. In chapter three, I examine how Israel’s 
 
 
pluralistic education system allows Haredi (i.e. ultra-Orthodox) Jews to teach values at odds 
with much of Israeli society. I further explain that other segments of the population express 
frustration over the subsidization of an education sector that provides no discernible benefit for 
a society with secular, materialistic visions of progress. Finally, I explain how Israel’s 
parliamentary system limits the likelihood of meaningful reform to address the grievances of 
secular Israeli society.  
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Introduction 
Background: American Education 
Legend has it that the British army band under the command of General Charles 
Cornwallis struck up “The World Turned Upside Down” as they capitulated at Yorktown. While 
that dramatic retelling of the siege is the source of scholarly debate, it is indisputable that the 
underlying subtext reverberated the world over. A ragtag army of farmers, fishermen, and 
craftsmen defeated the world’s preeminent military power and broke free from the bondage of 
overseas administration. More importantly, the notion of kings ruling by divine right was 
discarded in favor of government “deriving their powers from the consent of the governed.” No 
such project had been attempted on such a large scale since Antiquity. Truly, the world was 
turned upside down. 
 Defeating the British Army was an impressive feat, but perhaps even greater challenges 
lay ahead. While the flowery prose of the Declaration established fundamental principles of 
governance, the organization of the country quickly became a contentious dispute. Would 
states assume ultimate sovereignty in a confederated union, or would they relinquish 
considerable autonomy to a central government? How would power be divided across the 
government? Who would be considered a citizen, and who would be allowed to vote? These 
are contentious issues in the 21st century. One can only imagine how contentious they were 
when they were open-ended questions that would determine the republic’s destiny. It is no 
wonder that legend relays that when a group of Philadelphia citizens approached Benjamin 
Franklin to inquire about the type of government the constitutional delegates were creating, 
Franklin quipped “’a republic, if you can keep it.’” (Gilbertson, 2017)  
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 Franklin was not the only founder to recognize the fragility of the new republic. Shays’ 
Rebellion in Western Massachusetts, fomented by the perceived imposition of excessive taxes, 
laid bare the tension between maintaining order and protecting liberty (Kaestle, 1983). Anxiety 
surrounding the event convinced a previously tentative George Washington of the need for a 
constitution (Feer, 1969).  
 The Founders recognized that they would have to be proactive in other ways to fortify 
republican principles and maintain stability. In a rare display of consensus, Founders of all 
political stripes affirmed the importance of universal education (Hess, 2010), including bitter 
political foes Thomas Jefferson and John Adams (Kober, 2007). Jefferson was particularly 
vociferous in his advocacy for an education system that would instill future generations with 
adoration for the republic and the principles embedded therein. As Carpenter (2013) explains, 
If we couple Jefferson’s fear or mistrust of anything that smacked of monarchy, 
aristocracy, or Great Britain with this sense of the fragile nature of the new 
government, then we contextualize his repeated expressions of the need to 
educate future citizens. For Jefferson, the major distinguishing characteristic of a 
republic was the protection of individual liberty. The ultimate line of defense in 
the preservation of this liberty against governmental encroachment was the 
individual citizen. To be properly armed to perform this duty, citizens must be 
educated.  
 
Jefferson envisioned a universal elementary education for Virginia in which "the ultimate result 
of the whole scheme of education would be the teaching all the children of the state reading, 
writing, and common arithmetic.” (Conant, 1961, p. 94) These schools would create students of 
“superior genius” who, alongside the children of elites, might go on to study at secondary 
school. A select few of those would go on to college to form a “natural aristocracy,” the next 
generation of leaders.  
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Notably, Jefferson did not prescribe a specific curriculum to create model citizens. 
Rather, in the tradition of Enlightenment empiricist thinking, he felt that a broad education in 
classical languages, science, and humanities was conducive to the propagation of 
republicanism. While Jefferson advocated the virtues of a universal education system, he 
warned that compulsory education was anathema to the tenet of liberty. “It is better to 
tolerate the rare instance of a parent refusing to let his child be educated,” he extolled, “than 
to shock the common feelings and ideas by the forcible asportation and education of the infant 
against the will of the father.” (McDonald, 2017)  
Benjamin Rush, signer of the Declaration and Surgeon General of the Continental Army, 
agreed with Jefferson that education was paramount to the success of the country. However, 
his prescriptions were different. Rush lamented an educational landscape which was then 
diverse in composition and in teachings (Hess, 2010), but believed that the system could be 
remedied through compelling schools to inculcate young men with proper republican values. “I 
consider it is possible to convert men into republican machines,” Rush wrote in 1798. “This 
must be done, if we expect them to perform their parts properly, in the great machine of the 
government of the state. That republic is sophisticated with monarchy or aristocracy that does 
not revolve upon the wills of the people, and these must be fitted to each other by means of 
education before they can be made to produce regularity and unison in government.” (Johnson, 
2012, p. 153). 
Rush notes that a proper republican education was especially important in his native 
Pennsylvania, where “our citizens are composed of the natives of so many different kingdoms 
in Europe. Our schools of learning, by producing one general, and uniform system of education, 
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will render the mass of the people more homogeneous, and thereby fit them more easily for 
uniform and peaceable government.” ((Kurland & Lerner, 1986, ch. 18, document 30) Finally, 
Rush disagreed with Jefferson on the matter of compulsion, believing that the welfare of the 
republic demanded that all citizens receive the proper training to become “republican 
machines.” (Brodsky, 2004)   
Rush and Jefferson shared the same concern; they recognized that the United States 
could be a short-lived project due to the failure or erosion of its institutions, factional conflict, 
or foreign invasion. Moreover, they both recognized that education could have an important 
role to play to safeguard the republic. However, they reached markedly different conclusions 
about what that type of education system would look like. Whereas Jefferson advocated for a 
secular public school system and generally advocated a curriculum grounded in the humanities, 
Rush sought a compulsory, uniform education system replete with theological instruction as to 
“render the mass of the people more homogeneous and thereby fit them more easily for 
uniform and peaceable government.” (Kurland & Lerner, 1986, ch. 18, document 30) 
Philosophical Underpinnings  
How did two men who extolled the benefit of education as a bulwark against internal 
and external threats reach such notably different conclusions about American education? The 
short answer is that ideological consensus among the Founders only went as far as the issue of 
independence from Britain. Their disparate views of ideal government were largely colored by 
contemporary political philosophers, especially Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu (Padover, 
1958; McDowell, 1993). For Rush and other Federalists, the Hobbesian dystopia in which life 
was “nasty, brutish, and short” in the absence of adequately coercive government motivated 
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the notion that a highly functioning society demanded an education that would instill principles 
needed for the maintenance of democracy, among them religious observance and 
“subordination” to the law. Jefferson and other anti-Federalists, on the other hand, were not 
willing to compromise on the conservation of liberty, for in true Lockean fashion they believed 
that natural rights preceded government. As far as Jefferson was concerned, “under the law of 
nature, all men are born free, every one comes into the world with a right to his own person, 
which includes the liberty of moving and using it as his own will. This is what is called personal 
liberty.” (Adler, 2003, p. 56) So important was this condition, “our attachment to no nation on 
earth should supplant our attachment to liberty.” (Levander, 2006, p. 37)  
Educational pluralism exists on a spectrum. In extreme cases such as China, education is 
highly centralized and regulated. In Belgium, on the other hand, many students attend privately 
operated, publicly subsidized schools, though the state assumes regulatory responsibilities (Van 
Raemdonck & Maranto, 2018). The United States lies somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum. The Hobbesian view that government should manufacture consent through 
exclusively public education was constitutionally rejected in Pierce v Society of Sisters (1926). In 
a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon statute mandating public school 
education for all students on the grounds that children are not “the mere creature[s] of the 
state" (268 U.S. 510, 535). On the other hand, John Paul Stevens’ opinion in Zelman V Simmons-
Harris (2002) that public funding for religious schools would “increase the risk of religious strife 
and weaken the foundation of our democracy” highlights jurisprudential skepticism toward 
Lockean government restraint regarding shaping the public sphere. Like Madison and many of 
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his contemporaries, the American education system reflects skepticism toward the nature of 
both man and government (Padover, 1958).  
Tension between Liberty and Democracy 
The disagreement between Jefferson and Rush marks the beginning of a debate that has 
ebbed and flowed but continues to echo into the present: Should the government curtail liberty 
to mandate a uniform education that instills values conducive to democracy, including 
tolerance, civic participation, and patriotism? Or should the government defer to the wisdom 
and discretion of parents, who could potentially elect for an education that teaches values not 
conducive to democracy? This dispute is situated within a broader debate about the balance 
between liberty and democracy. To what extent should people be allowed to do as they please 
(or in this case, do what they please for their children)? At what point does individual liberty 
jeopardize the common good? 
Concerns Regarding Educational Liberty 
 When it comes to education, the trend in the United States over the past two centuries 
has been increasing education “for democracy” (i.e. delivering an increasingly uniform 
education that instills democratic principles) at the expense of liberty (i.e. letting parents do as 
they please). Horace Mann’s vision of the common school in the mid-19th century represented 
an enduring pendulum swing. Whereas education in the colonial era and in the new republic 
was elective and nominally diverse, Mann’s vision for education was compulsory schooling in 
which “the state was conceived as ultimate guardian and guarantor of a social order in which 
individuals would be liberated from intermediate traditions and loyalties, in the interest of 
progress, enlightenment, and national integration.” (Glenn, 1988, p. 236) In an age of religious 
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and moralistic revivalism, Mann believed that the common school would serve as a safeguard 
against “fraud, intrigue, corruption and violence.” (Kaestle, 1983, p. 49) As Tyack (1974) 
explains 
the 19th century was an age of institutionalization when agencies separated the 
insane into asylums, the poor into almshouses, the criminal into prisons. Fear of 
disorder, of contamination, of the crumbling of familiar social forms such as the 
family, prompted reformers to create institutions which could bring order into 
the lives of deviant persons and, perchance, heal the society itself by the force of 
an example. 
 
The common school would not only serve as an engine of economic industrialization, but as a 
force to restore order, righteousness, and bonds of kinship to a population in the throes of 
rapid economic and demographic changes.   
Church Versus State 
Though the battle for educational autonomy ostensibly occurs between citizens and the 
state, within Western societies the dispute is often over whether children ought to be educated 
by the state or their church, the two entities engaged in a bitter, millennia-long dispute for 
mastery over the souls and loyalties of the masses. The conflict was particularly pronounced in 
the First French Republic, where the Jacobins repudiated Catholic traditions and canon and 
“regarded the Catholic Church of this period not only as one of the most powerful enemies of 
the republic, but also as an enemy of ‘modern civilization, progress, industrialism, capitalism, 
urbanization and almost every new phenomenon, which were denounced as a sources of 
temptations, degradation, and immorality.’” (Meuret, 2004, p. 239)  
The Catholic Church in France had enjoyed centuries of nearly exclusive license to 
educate French youth, and Rome’s official position was that the Church was the sole legitimate 
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proprietor of education. Unsurprisingly, churches were not a neutral bystander in the social 
conflict and lobbied vociferously for the right to provide education. Many French youth 
continued to receive schooling through churches even after such practices were legally 
outlawed (Glenn, 1988).  
While France represents the most salient example of schools as battlegrounds between 
church and state, similar conflicts have played out elsewhere, including the United States.2 Such 
conflict is inevitable under a centralized system, for as Berner (2017) explains, the state cannot 
create an ideologically neutral space, and the secular humanism that guides current 
educational practices quashes the role of religion in public education. Truly, “there is simply no 
way to honor a Catholic way of seeing the child in our current public education structure.” (p. 
20)   
In the United States, conflict over schooling plays out through evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary means, specifically democratic lawmaking and litigation (Carpenter II & Kafer, 
2012). As a result, the dispute between church and state over the right to schooling is ongoing. 
The history of Blaine Amendments underscores the enduring nature of the conflict. Nearly 150 
years ago, Congress narrowly failed to pass a constitutional amendment outlawing the 
establishment of religion (Carpenter II & Kafer, 2012). Forty states went on to pass so-called 
Blaine amendments to their state constitutions, and the interpretation of the amendment 
typically prohibits public funding of religious schools. This year, the United States Supreme 
Court will hear Espionza v Montana Department of Revenue to determine whether tax credit 
                                                          
2 Notably, no church in the United States has ever enjoyed the same political influence as the Catholic Church in 
France, a reality reflecting our founding ethos of separation of church and state as well as the comparatively 
modest political power that Protestant churches historically held compared to the Catholic Church.  
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scholarship programs can fund parochial schools in states with Blaine Amendments (Shapiro et 
al., 2019).  
Schooling and Civic Outcomes 
Governments across the globe typically expend significant resources to make formal 
schooling available to all residents. Government subsidization of education is surely a display of 
compliance with international norms. After all, the basic right to education has been codified in 
international law multiple times, most famously through Article 26 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which affirms that elementary education should be free and compulsory. The 
provision of education holds other benefits for governments beyond optics alone. Economic 
modernization and growth represent an important benefit, as participation in a 21st century 
economy typically requires at least basic numeracy and literacy. Most importantly, the 
provision of education allows governments to supervise or control the process which ostensibly 
shapes the norms, values and knowledge base of the next generation of citizens.  
 The United States government assumes a greater role than other liberal democratic 
governments in ensuring that schools inculcate students with desirable civic values. Proponents 
of a plural education system, however, argue that a centralized, homogenizing schooling model 
is unnecessary and unhelpful for sustaining democracy.  Of course, history does not provide the 
benefit of counterfactuals. There is no way of knowing how our station would be different if the 
United States had maintained a pluralistic education system instead of supposedly 
homogenizing common schools. However, there is an evidence base which can help inform how 
a pluralistic education system would shape our future if adopted.  
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First, the civic outcomes of students who attend private schools offer insight into 
whether non-government schools typically impede or foster the republican virtues conducive to 
the flourishing of a liberal democracy. Wolf (2007) succinctly summarizes the literature on the 
topic, indicating that private schools appear as adept as public schools, if not more so, at 
promoting desirable civic values. Chapter two of this dissertation further contributes to the 
literature to show that private-school educated adults are as likely as public school-educated 
adults to vote in national elections, even after controlling for individual-level covariates.  
Second, the United States can draw lessons from other countries. For example, 
proponents of educational pluralism often endorse Holland’s diverse government-funded 
education landscape as proof of concept for the feasibility of a pluralistic education system in a 
liberal democratic society. Chapter two highlights that centralization offers no guarantee of 
social reproduction or stability.  
In most Arab states, senior state officials and bodies determine an authoritative 
set of truths and a codified national and/or religious identity. The educational 
bureaucracy translates such authoritative determinations into the curriculum. 
Teachers transmit that to students, who are then examined on how well they 
have absorbed it. For instance, “national education” is a subject in Egypt, Jordan, 
and Palestine, and the texts rely on a single, official version of history and 
politics. (Muasher et al., 2018)  
 
Despite such efforts, Arab governments have failed to deliver a quality education system 
that assists citizens with gainful employment. That failure has contributed to unrest and 
upheaval (Brookings Institution Arab World Learning Barometer, 2014). On the other hand, 
chapter three exposes some of the drawbacks or limitations of educational pluralism and 
decentralization in a liberal democracy. Specifically, Haredim in Israel use education for 
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spiritual, religious and cultural purposes. Secular Israeli society plausibly experiences minimal 
financial return to their tax investment in Haredi education.  
Research in Context 
This endeavor is not the first attempt to use comparative studies to inform educational 
pluralism in the United States (see, for example, Wolf & Macedo, 2004; Chakrabarti & Peterson, 
2008; Fox & Buchanan, 2017). Extant comparisons typically draw perspectives from Europe or 
English-speaking countries, which are sensible insofar as American institutions, cultural 
heritage, and faith draw more influence from European Christendom than any other faith or 
region. However, much can be learned from studying other educational systems. For one, the 
United States is a nation of immigrants, and it continues to become more demographically 
diverse. The next generation of education policymakers might engage in more global 
perspective-taking as they look abroad for solutions at home. More importantly, comparative 
studies offer as much value in forcing introspection as they do in conferring knowledge about 
other systems. Examining dissimilar education contexts might allow us to recognize features of 
our system that we take for granted.  
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Chapter One 
Silencing the seventh trumpet: Analyzing the effect of private schooling on voting behavior 
Abstract 
The United States has one of the lowest election turnout rates in the developed world. 
Consequently, social scientists are perpetually seeking to expand upon their knowledge of what 
factors are associated with voting, or the lack thereof. Commonly identified factors including 
age, income, race, and educational attainment have been studied extensively. However, while 
quantity of education is deemed important, educational setting is overlooked. The limited 
literature that exists on the topic suggests that private schools have a positive impact on civic 
outcomes, including voter participation. In using a rich, nationally representative dataset of 
about 1,500 American adults—the Understanding America Study based out of the University of 
Southern California—this study reexamines whether attending a private school effects whether 
Americans vote. It also sheds light on a heretofore-unanswered question: How does private 
schooling affect which candidate an individual supports? Overall, the data indicate that private 
schooling appears to have no impact on voter turnout, but that attending some private school is 
associated with a lower likelihood of voting for Donald Trump in 2016. 
Motivation 
It stands to reason that childhood experiences influence whether and how people vote. 
Consequently, it should also be true that school experiences influence voting behavior, as 
individuals spend a significant amount of their formative years within schools, which help to 
form their attitudes about the world around them. I seek to understand the effect of private 
schooling on voting behavior because access to vouchers, which provide government funding 
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for underprivileged students to attend private schools, is set to increase during the Trump 
Administration (Brown et al., 2017). Rigorous research should inform the consequential effects. 
After all, voting matters. From an abstract perspective, democratic societies ought to 
ascribe value to voting, an exercise in democracy that Alexander Hamilton labeled ”’one of the 
most important rights of the subject… That right by which we exist as a free people’” (Hamilton, 
1879: 30). From a policy perspective, low voter turnout has practical consequences. Because 
minorities and low-income voters turn out at disproportionately low rates in US elections, their 
policy objectives go unfulfilled and economic policy is less redistributive than those voters 
would desire (Hajnal, 2015; Meltzer and Richard, 1983). Moreover, President Trump secured a 
victory over Hillary Clinton with only 80,000 additional votes across three states while President 
Bush triumphed by 537 votes in Florida (Purdum, 2000). Simply put, small changes in who votes 
or how people vote can and do have dramatic consequences, even in presidential elections. 
Literature Review 
private schools and the likelihood of voting. 
There is some high-quality instructive literature examining the effect of private school 
on the likelihood of voting in the United States. Dee (2005) uses a probit model and 
instrumental variable analysis to find that Catholic school enrollment is associated with an 
approximately 10% increase in an individual’s likelihood of voting. Similarly, Dill (2009) finds 
that private school enrollment is associated with increased voting when using logistic 
regression and controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. Smith and Sikkink (1999) use the 
National Household Education Surveys Program (NHES) and conducted multiple-variable 
regression analysis and found that Catholic and Christian school-goers are significantly more 
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civically engaged, including voting in recent elections. Moreover, their study revealed that there 
are appreciable differences between parents who send their children to public school and 
parents who send their children to private school. Notably, parents of private-school-educated 
students were up to 15% more likely to have voted in recent elections. If civic-minded parents 
have civic-minded offspring, as one would expect, then these findings underscore the need for 
models to properly control for parent-level covariates. 
Greene et al. (1999) use logistic regression and find that among Texas adults, attending 
some private school is associated with a higher probability of voting. Interestingly, however, 
they find that adults who received all of their education in a private school did not have a 
statistically significant increased probability of voting. That curious finding squares with other 
literature concerning the effect of private schooling on civic values. For example, Greene and 
Kingsbury (2017) report that private schooling had a statistically and practically significant 
positive effect on anti-Semitic attitudes but that the dosage effect became slightly negative 
after approximately 7 years of private education. In other words, an adult who received half of 
their K-12 education in a private school would be less anti-Semitic than an adult who received 
none of their education there and also less anti-Semitic than an adult who attended for 
12 years. Whatever the cause, these findings underscore the need for flexibility in modeling the 
relationship between voting outcomes and private school enrollment. 
Fleming et al. (2014) employ a matching design to investigate the impact of estimate the 
impact of Milwaukee’s voucher program on civic outcomes. They poll currently enrolled high-
school students and find that after controlling for parent-level covariates, 66% of voucher 
lottery winners claimed they would vote in the future compared with 55% of lottery losers, a 
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spread closely resembling Dee’s (2005) instrumental variable estimate. Their dependent 
variable raises some concerns regarding measurement error, as self-prediction of voting is 
notoriously unreliable. Indeed, a large share of people who claim that they intend to vote will 
not do so. More surprisingly, up to half of those who claim that they will not vote do in fact 
vote (Rogers and Aida, 2012). Asking high-school students about their intention to vote years in 
the future likely only compounds the measurement error. 
In addition to these studies, there is one instructive experimental study. Carlson et al. 
(2017) compared the civic outcomes of winners and losers of the New York Choice Scholarships 
Foundation Program lottery by matching the treatment and control groups to official voting 
records and found no distinguishable differences in outcomes in recent elections. Of course, 
experiments come with a caveat regarding external validity: Private schools in New York City  
are not necessarily representative of private schools nationwide, and it would be unsound to 
assume that the effect is universal. 
private schools and partisanship. 
There is scant literature informing how attending a private school might affect political 
affiliation or partisanship. However, an examination of the differences in curriculum and school 
composition can provide some clues. Paterson (2000) performs a content analysis of textbooks 
used at Christian parochial schools (which constitute the majority of private schools in the 
United States) and reports that they espouse ideologically conservative viewpoints by means of 
integrating religious and nonreligious material and citing conservative thinkers with approval 
while omitting or downplaying more progressive thinkers. Paterson (2000) predicts that a 
conservative curriculum might influence later-in-life outcomes, opining “such training might 
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increase the Balkanization of our society” (p. 1). Meanwhile, Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman (1995) 
as well as Zimmerman (2010) argue that American history in public schools is often taught from 
a critical perspective that discards a culturally hegemonic perspective in favor of one that 
emphasizes the experiences of subaltern groups. In other words, public school history 
curriculum is typically consistent with liberal perspectives, although there is significant variation 
across states.  
Several studies have considered the impact of school racial integration on personal 
attitudes. These studies generally find that higher levels of diversity within a school is 
associated with increased racial tolerance and empathy for other groups (Stephan & Rosenfield, 
1978; Wells & Crain, 1994; Wells et al., 2009), at least in the long run (Schofield & Hausmann, 
2004). Given lower levels of integration in the private school sector (Reardon & Yun, 2003), to 
the extent that increased empathy for minorities is associated with liberal, Democratic ideology 
(Loewen et al., 2017), one might expect that private schools produce more conservative, 
Republican-leaning voters. 
Hypothesis 
The compilation of extant literature indicates that the effect of private schooling on 
voter participation is in the null-positive range. This is not surprising. Sikkink (2013)notes that 
“public schools are performance-oriented bureaucracies, which have organizational imperatives 
of individual achievement, conformity, and order” (p. 347). Therefore, “teachers tend to avoid 
normative discussions with explicit content except in the sporadic and isolated cases in which 
classroom disruption or student conflict demands it” (p. 348). On the other hand, private 
schools are less concerned with strict apoliticism and are marked with higher levels of social 
19 
 
capital, which may be conducive to civic participation (Sikkink, 2013). Consequently, I anticipate 
observing a neutral to positive correlation between private school enrollment and voting. 
Analyses of private and public school history curricula indicate that private schools 
might on balance produce more conservative students. Moreover, private schools, especially 
parochial schools, might consciously promote moral foundations that are associated with 
conservative ideology, specifically, in-group loyalty, deference to authority, and sanctity (Haidt, 
2012). Finally, lower levels of integration might also be associated with conservative attitudes. 
Sikkink (2013), however, provides cause to suspect that the effects of private schools on 
partisanship may be limited, noting that “the picture of religious schools as sectarian, counter-
cultural institutions is overdrawn…The most conservative Christian schools absorb much of the 
surrounding cultural milieu” (p. 342). In other words, private and public schools alike might 
simply reinforce the political sensibilities of communities rather than change them. That the 
majority of American teachers, the would-be agents of change, work within driving distance of 
their hometown certainly lends credence to that argument (Boyd et al., 2005). Consequently, I 
anticipate that private school attendance may be positively correlated with Republican 
affiliation and conservative ideology, but that the magnitude of any association would be small. 
Data 
Data are drawn from the Understanding America Study (UAS) based out of the University of 
Southern California. The UAS is a nationally representative rolling dataset that polls 6000 
American adults completing surveys on a wide variety of topics, from knowledge about the 
Ebola virus to sleeping patterns.  
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Figure 1: Years of private schooling for students with at least one year of private schooling 
 
Surveys began in May 2014 and are ongoing as of May 2018. To ensure that the sample is in 
fact nationally representative and to mitigate concerns about nonresponse bias, respondents 
with unreliable computer or Internet access received tablets. Moreover, surveys remunerated 
on a per-minute basis (up to US$20) to ensure an acceptably high response rate. 
This study combines several UAS datasets3 that together contain the variables necessary 
to model whether there are differences in the likelihood of voting between private-school-
educated adults and public-school-educated adults after controlling for a variety of background 
characteristics. These datasets range from 1760 to 6422 observations and from a response rate 
of 74.25% to 95.34%. One of these datasets, labeled UAS 1, was dispensed to every individual 
participating in UAS surveys, and contained post-stratification weights to ensure that the survey 
                                                          
3Certain data (e.g. demographic information) are cross-sectional. For those datasets that are longitudinal (e.g. 
the 2016 election survey), the model utilizes responses captured immediately preceding the 2016 election. 
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was representative of the US population with regard to sociodemographic composition. I have 
used that weight in the models that follow. 
Note that the dependent variable is self-reported voting in a post-election poll; 
respondents were asked whether they voted in the 2012, 2014, and 2016 national elections and 
who they voted for. At first glance, the high percentage of respondents who claim to have 
voted—92.5% in 2016, 63% in 2014%, and 77% in 2012—could generate concerns about 
whether the sample is in fact nationally representative. However, there are two sensible 
explanations to mostly allay such fears. First, deceit about voting is a well-known phenomenon 
in social science research (Clausen, 1968–1969; Hanmer et al., 2014), as “people tend to over-
estimate the likelihood that they performed a socially desirable behavior in the past and to 
over-estimate the likelihood that they will perform a socially desirable behavior in the future” 
(Rogers and Aida, 2012, p.3). Estimates of over-reporting range from about 8% to 14% (Belli et 
al., 2001) to as high as 20% (McDonald, 2003; Martinez, 2003). Second, it is likely that 
respondents within the UAS experienced something akin to Hawthorne effects in experimental 
research, in which members of the experiment modify their behavior because they are being 
observed. Specifically, it is likely that being repeatedly polled about the election increases 
interest in the outcome and one’s likelihood of voting, a situation exacerbated by the fact that 
the rolling poll gained national attention in the summer of 2016 because it was one of the few 
national election polls to predict a Trump victory. Unless private-school-educated adults and 
public-school-educated adults are misrepresenting their voting history at different rates, 
something that is not intuitively expected, then overestimates should not introduce bias. 
However, overestimates increase the likelihood of a false positive finding.   
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Methods and Results 
likelihood of voting 
Unadjusted voting comparisons confirm the original hypothesis that private-school-
educated adults are more likely to vote. Each additional year of private school is associated 
with a 0.25–0.75 percentage point increase in voting within the past three national elections. 
Moreover, unadjusted voting comparisons indicate that private-school-educated adults closely 
resembled the rest of the population during the 2012 presidential election vis-à-vis partisan 
divide, but in 2016, each additional year of private school was associated with a 1.1% decrease 
in the likelihood of voting for Trump, contrary to the original hypothesis. 
Of course, unadjusted results are not a particularly useful measure of the effect of 
private schooling on voting, as enrolling in a private school is not random but correlated with 
factors predictive of voting. In the UAS dataset, an adult with any private education is 10.5% 
less likely to have reported financial struggles during childhood and 40% more likely to identify 
as Catholic. Given that those characteristics positively correlate with voting, it is readily 
apparent that the unadjusted results do not render a meaningful look at the effect of private 
school vis-à-vis voting. Several models are introduced to estimate the effect of private 
schooling on turnout and which candidate or party a voter supports4. First, a probit model to 
estimate the effect on turnout 
Pr(Votei=1|X)=Φ(β0+β1Priv_Yearsi+β2Priv_Years2i+β3Agei+β4Age2i+β5Relig_Affili+β6Stateborni 
+β7Econ_Characi+β8Parental_Educi+β9Born_USi+β10Racei+β11Femalei+ei 
 
 
                                                          
4 These models and the displayed results utilize the full sample of respondents. 6.4% of the sample did not obtain a 
high-school diploma, so in some cases the counterfactual is no education rather than equivalent years of public or 
private education. When the sample is restricted to individuals with a high-school diploma, statistical significance 
of coefficients of interest do not change in any model. 
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These controls are intended to attenuate the endogeneity in the decision to enroll a child in a 
private school. Consequently, I control for childhood characteristics rather than adult ones. This 
has two benefits. First, they are more meaningful in terms of mitigating endogeneity. An adult’s 
income or educational attainment should have no predictive power of whether that individual’s 
parents decided to enroll them in a private school as a child. Rather, the parents’ income and 
educational attainment has explanatory power. Moreover, characteristics such as religiosity, 
cognitive abilities5, income, or educational attainment could plausibly be a part of the 
treatment of attending a private school, so controlling for them may be problematic. 
Illustratively, if private schools are better at promoting intelligence (as defined by numerical 
and verbal literacy), which is positively correlated with voter turnout (Henderson & Chatfield, 
2011; Mayer, 2011), then controlling for attainment biases the estimated effect toward zero. 
Yet, post-educational covariates are not entirely without merit. Considering that 
individuals tend to vote the same way as their parents (Lyons, 2005), controlling for political 
ideology in voting turnout models does have some benefit, as it proxies for the political beliefs 
of their parents, which is perhaps the most obvious omitted variable. Measuring religiosity 
serves much the same purpose. Consequently, I also offer models that control for income using 
household income brackets, religiosity (proxied by how often the individual attends religious 
services), intelligence (using combined scores from numerical and literacy tests), and political 
ideology (measured on a 1–10 Likert-type scale). Including these covariates also adds the 
                                                          
5 The intelligence variable is a composite measure of the Lipkus numeracy test and the cognitive reflection test. 
The former is a reliable, internally consistent measure of statistical numeracy (Cokely et al., 2012). The latter ‘is a 
widely used measure of the propensity to engage in analytic or deliberative reasoning in lieu of gut feelings or 
intuitions’ (Bialek and Pennycook, 2017). 
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benefit of illuminating potential causal pathways. Returning to the previous example, if a 
positive voting effect becomes null once controlling for numeracy and literacy scores, it might 
suggest that private school enrollment begets critical thinking, which in turn increases voting. 
Note that the 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections outcomes are not pooled but treated as 
unique phenomena, as each election is indeed distinctive, and effects vary from election to 
election. A glance at Appendix 1A illustrates the rationale: African Americans were about 
20 percentage points more likely to vote in Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign, all else being 
equal, but practically indistinguishable from other groups in the subsequent midterm election. 
Overall, I find no statistically significant correlation between private schooling and the 
likelihood of voting in any election year, a finding that is not sensitive to model specification 
(see Appendix 1A). However, that is not proof that there is in fact no effect, but rather that the 
estimated effect is not distinguishable from zero. As figure 2 illustrates, there is some evidence 
to support Greene et al.’s (1999) finding that there is a positive effect derived from a few years 
of education vis-à-vis voting, but returns diminish or even become negative over time. 
 
Figure 2: Likelihood of voting in 2014 election. 
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The model would ideally consider subgroup effects for several groups, including 
Catholics, African Americans, and particularly those who report a disadvantaged childhood, as it 
is plausible that disadvantaged students might experience a larger positive effect from private 
schooling. Placement in a safe school environment with strong community involvement and 
openness to political discourse might spur civic engagement relative to comparable public 
school peers, or so the thought goes. Unfortunately, however, power limitations preclude such 
analysis. The only subgroups for which the model can meaningfully derive a unique effect are 
men and women, whom the models estimate are practically indistinguishable with regard to a 
private schooling effect. 
party and candidate support. 
A similar probit model explores the relationship between private schooling and party 
affiliation. Notably, the model eliminates the Likert-type scale partisanship variable, as this 
would wash out other effects. Moreover, age appears as a linear variable within these models, 
as American voters tend to become more conservative as they age (Maniam & Smith, 2017). 
These models produce some interesting and perhaps surprising results. While private 
schooling did not have any practical or statistical significance in explaining how individuals cast 
their vote in the 2012 election, it did affect voting in the 2016 election, specifically with respect 
to President Trump. As figure 3 illustrates, adults who attended some private schools were 
significantly less likely to vote for Donald Trump (compared with all other candidates) than 
adults who only attended public schools. 
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Figure 3: Likelihood of voting for Donald Trump in 2016 election. 
 
Specifically, an adult who attended 1 year of private school had a 5 percentage point decrease 
in the likelihood of voting for Trump, all else being equal, compared with someone exclusively 
educated in a public school. Meanwhile, an adult who attended 7 years of a private school had 
a 10 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump, all else being equal. Those 
with 12 years of private education are more likely to vote for Trump than individuals with only 
some private education, but still less likely than those with 12 years of public education. Note 
that joint significance tests show some sensitivity to model specification, as controlling for 
educational attainment and intelligence lower the confidence level of the joint significance test 
below the 90% confidence level. However, this may capture a mediating effect. It is likely that 
private schools deliver a better or tailor-made education that promotes higher intelligence or 
educational attainment. Because intelligence and attainment are negatively correlated with 
supporting Trump (see Appendix 2D), controlling for them decreases the magnitude of the 
effect. 
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Interestingly, there is no practically or statistically significant effect of private schooling 
with respect to support for Hillary Clinton (see Appendix 2D), as many private-school-educated 
adults opted for a third party candidate. These findings call into question whether there is in 
fact a private school liberalizing effect, or whether private-school-educated adults simply 
rejected Trump. An illustrative way to consider this is to employ the same probit model and 
examine the effect on individuals who claim to identify with the Republican platform. 
As figure 4 illustrates, the results are basically replicated: a few years of private school 
has a large effect on identifying as Republican while those with 12 years of private schooling 
closely resemble individuals with no private education. As figure 5 illustrates, the effect of 
private schooling on Democratic alignment roughly mirrors it, though the model is more 
sensitive to model specification. 
 
Figure 4: Likelihood of aligning with the Republican platform. 
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Figure 5: Likelihood of aligning with the Democratic platform 
 
 The hypothesized nonlinear relationship between private schooling and voting 
outcomes is predicated on an assumption that students with exclusively private education 
might have fundamentally different backgrounds from students with some private education, 
and that controls within the model fail to capture these potentially meaningful differences. I 
explore this hypothesis further by assuming a linear relationship between voting outcomes and 
private years of schooling while omitting those with exclusively private schooling from the 
sample. When utilizing this approach, estimates once again indicate no practical or statistically 
significant correlation between private schooling and the likelihood of voting. Meanwhile, each 
additional year of private schooling is associated with a 1.29 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of aligning with the Democratic platform, all else equal, in the most pared down 
model. The estimate is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In the fully specified 
model, each additional year of private schooling is associated with a 1.21 percentage point 
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increase in the likelihood of aligning with the Democratic platform, all else equal. The estimate 
is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.  
Linear models that omit those with exclusively private education suggest that private 
schooling is not only associated with more liberal values, but specific repudiation of President 
Trump. In the 2012 election, private schooling is associated with a .33 percentage point 
decrease in the likelihood of supporting Mitt Romney in the simplest model and a .54 
percentage point decrease in the fully specified model, all else equal. Neither estimate is 
statistically significant. In 2016, however, the most pared down model estimates that each 
additional year of private schooling is associated with a 2.25 percentage point decrease in the 
likelihood of supporting Donald Trump while the most specified model estimates that an 
additional year of private school is associated with a 2.19 percentage point decrease, all else 
equal. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  
To test the Trump repudiation hypothesis further, I create an indicator variable for 
individuals who voted for Mitt Romney in 2012 but a candidate other than Donald Trump in 
2016, as most of those individuals plausibly have centrist or conservative political views but 
specific objections to Donald Trump. Using the same linear model that omits those with 12 
years of private education, each additional year of private schooling is associated with a .59 
percentage point increase in defecting from the GOP in 2016 in the pared down model and a 
.50 percentage point increase in the fully specified model, all else equal. Both estimates are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  
Further exploration appears to confirm the hypothesis that students with exclusively 
private education are fundamentally different from students with some private education. 
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Compared to the general population, receiving exclusively private education is associated with 
a 5.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of supporting President Trump in the full 
model and a 6.9 percentage point increase in the pared down model. Neither estimate is 
statistically significant, plausibly because of the limited number of individuals to receive 
exclusively private education. Compared to adults with some private education, those with 
exclusively private education have a 14.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
supporting Trump in the simple model and 15.3 percentage point increase in the fully specified 
model, all else equal. Both estimates are significant at the 95% confidence level.  
Overall, modeling a linear relationship between private schooling and voting outcomes 
appears to confirm the original findings: Additional years of private schooling have no 
discernible impact on turnout but a modest positive correlation with Democratic Party 
alignment. Moreover, additional years of private schooling are associated with repudiation of 
Donald Trump. Finally, there appear to be nonlinear dosage effects from private schooling vis-à-
vis voting behavior. Specifically, while more private schooling overall is associated with more 
liberal voting behavior, adults who received all of their education in a private school buck that 
trend and display conservative voting tendencies relative to adults with only some private 
school education.  
Discussion 
Evidence presented in this study is descriptive and correlational. After all, attending a 
private school is not random, and it would be impossible to fully control for everything that 
distinguishes private-school-educated adults from public-school-educated adults. Nevertheless, 
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it does offer suggestive evidence that private schooling has no observable effect on voting 
turnout, but an appreciably large effect on how individuals cast their vote. 
At first blush, the observation that some private schooling is associated with progressive 
ideology is surprising. Paterson’s (2000) content analysis of Christian parochial school textbooks 
would give one the impression that private schools should produce conservative graduates. A 
cursory consideration of the modern politics of school choice only reinforces that belief. After 
all, advocacy for market-based education reform can be traced to the vanguards of the Old 
Right, whose anti-statist views led them to caution, in the words of Frank Chodorov, that “What 
is known as ‘free education’ is the least free of all, for it is a state-owned institution; it is 
socialized education.” (Demarrais, 2006, p. 218) Promotion of market-based solutions (and by 
extension, opposition to monopolistic government control) also became tenets of libertarian 
and religious right policy. Schools were one of the main battlegrounds in Patrick Buchanan’s 
‘cultural war for the soul of America’, for public schools were, according to Pat Robertson, 
“’destroying democracy in America… (Their leaders) a group of ideological extremists who are 
so fixated with their illogical educational theories that they have lost touch with reality.’” 
(Edwards, 1998, p. 9) 
Logically, many religious or anti-statist parents opposed to public school politics and 
curricula would place their children in private institutions where pedagogy and practice (e.g. 
school prayer) align with their values. Given the frequency with which children adopt the views 
of their parents, it seems that private-school-educated adults should be disproportionately 
conservative, their education notwithstanding. 
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So why is attending a private school associated with liberal voting? This phenomenon 
might be explained in part by school composition. Although public schools are more diverse 
than private schools, the latter appear more adept at promoting racial harmony within 
classrooms and lunchrooms, perhaps because class distinctions are mostly neutralized or 
religious morality changes student behavior (Greene and Mellow, 1998). Racial harmony may 
foster more liberal, Democratic-leaning ideology. Moreover, Catholic Schools, composing a 
majority of private schools nationally, often have explicit social justice themes. In Catholic 
Schools and the Common Good, Byrk et al. (1993) explain that with the election of President 
Kennedy in 1960, the perceived importance of Catholic Schools to protect and nurture Catholic 
students in a hostile new world faded. However, in the tumult of the era they found 
a new raison d’être: social justice. Catholic Schools openly and sometimes even defiantly 
embraced pluralism, a clear affirmation of the spirit of the recently convened Vatican II, which 
asserted that schools should be ‘enlivened by the spirit of freedom and charity’ (Byrk et al., 
1993,p. 51). 
While Catholic Schools’ commitment to social justice might explain the overall private 
school liberalizing effect, an intriguing question remains: Why do adults with a few years of 
private education appear to be more progressive than those with none, while adults who spend 
their entire educational career in one setting closely resemble one another? One potential 
explanation is that those who are observed to have some years of private education have been 
exposed to a diverse range of settings, which might give them more progressive sensibilities, 
especially if the demographics of their public and private schools were unique from one 
another. Another is that parents who send their children to private school for 12 years are 
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fundamentally different in some unobservable way. For example, parents might seek a few 
years of private education due to concerns about the quality of public schools, but parents who 
invest in 12 years of private education perhaps have strong value-based motivations on which 
they are unwilling to compromise. In seeking to explain their finding that some private school 
exposure increases measures of tolerance but an exclusively private school setting does not, 
Greene et al. posit ‘those whose families chose to send them to private school for all 12 years 
did so for clear and purposeful reasons. They may have an ideological opposition to the type of 
educational experience they believe that the government-run public schools provide, for 
example’ (p. 441). 
Perhaps the most sensible explanation is that the liberalizing effect is driven by students 
who were enrolled in a private school during their elementary schools but not later during their 
academic years, as it is plausible that the politics of private elementary schools and private 
secondary schools are quite distinct. Indeed, many private elementary schools boast high levels 
of integration and engage students with social justice themes at a young age (Miller, 2015). 
Private high schools, on the other hand, are perhaps comparatively more religious and 
conservative (Paterson, 2000). However, evidence does not back this theory. Changing the 
Republican affiliation probit model to years of private high school instead of overall private 
years and a quadratic term indicates that each additional year of private high school is 
associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the 
Republican platform and a 1.9 percentage point increase in aligning with the Democratic 
platform, all else being equal. Meanwhile, taking the same approach but using a private 
elementary school dosage variable also fails to support the hypothesis: each additional year of 
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elementary school is associated with a 0.3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of 
aligning with the Democratic platform and a 1.9 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of 
aligning with the Republican platform, all else being equal. All of these estimates are 
statistically insignificant and must be interpreted with caution, as there are only 205 adults in 
the sample with any private high-school education and 294 with any private elementary 
education. 
Conclusion 
Progressives winced when President Trump appointed Betsy Devos as Secretary of 
Education. Parroting her call that market-based education reforms would ‘advance God’s 
Kingdom’, they successfully fashioned a narrative that school choice is driven by conservative 
and corporate machinations and that private schools are factories of future conservative voters 
(Segar, 2017). Empirical evidence casts doubt over that narrative: spending a few years in a 
private school is associated with decreased support for Donald Trump while spending 12 years 
in one makes an individual practically indistinguishable from their exclusively public-school-
educated counterparts vis-à-vis support for Trump. This does not mean that increased access to 
vouchers would have been the difference in the 2000 or 2016 elections; drawing 
generalizations from 2016 is tenuous given that it was such an unusual election year. Moreover, 
it is impossible to say whether the correlation would be the same in magnitude or even 
direction with a different population. One should therefore be cautious in concluding that 
increased access to vouchers in the future will shrink the Republican voter base. However, it 
does provide evidence that private schools are not the path to God’s Kingdom as Devos and 
likeminded allies hope, nor the road to political ruin that Democrats fear.  
35 
 
References 
Belli, R., Traugott, M. & Beckmann, M. (2001). What leads to vote overreports? Contrasts of 
 overreporters to validated voters and admitted nonvoters in the American National 
 Election Studies. Journal of Official Statistics 17, 479–498.  
Bialek, M. & Pennycook, G. (2017) The cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures. 
 Behavior Research Methods. Epub ahead of print 28 August. DOI: 10.3758/s13428-017-
 0963-x.  
Boyd, D., Lankford, H. & Loeb, S. (2005) The draw of home: how teachers’ preferences for 
 proximity disadvantage urban schools. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 
 24(1), 113–132.  
Brown, E., Strauss, V., Douglas-Gabriel, D. (2017) Trump’s first full education budget: deep cuts 
 to public school programs in pursuit of school choice. The Washington Post. Available 
 at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trumps-first-full-education-
 budget-deep-cuts-to-public-school-programs-in-pursuit-of-school-
 choice/2017/05/17/2a25a2cc-3a41-11e7-
 885421f359183e8c_story.html?utm_term=.664d3eda4280  
Bryk, A., Lee, V., Holland, P. (1993) Catholic Schools and the Common Good. Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press.  
Carlson, D., Chingos, M., & Campbell, D. (2017) The effect of private school vouchers on political 
 participation: experimental evidence from New York City. Journal of Research on 
 Educational Effectiveness 10, 545–569. 
Clausen, A. (1968–1969) Response validity: vote report. The Public Opinion Quarterly 32(4), 
 588–606.  
Cokely, E., Galesic, M. & Schulz, E. (2012) Measuring risk literacy: the Berlin numeracy test. 
 Judgement and Decision Making 7(1), 25–47.  
Dee, T. (2005) The effects of Catholic schooling on civic participation. International Tax and 
 Public Finance 12, 605–625.  
Demarrais, K. (2006) The haves and have mores: fueling a conservative ideological war on 
 public education (or tracking the money). Educational Studies 39(3), 201–240.  
Dill, JS. (2009) Preparing for public life: school sector and the educational context of lasting 
 citizen formation. Social Forces 87(3), 1265–1290.  
Edwards, J. (1998) Opposing Censorship in the Public Schools: Religion, Morality and 
 Literature. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Fleming, D., Mitchell, W. & McNally, M. (2014) Can markets make citizens? School vouchers, 
 political tolerance, and civic engagement. Journal of School Choice 8(2): 213–236.  
36 
 
Greene, JP. & Kingsbury, I. (2017) The relationship between public and private schooling and 
 anti-Semitism. Journal of School Choice 11(1): 111–130.  
Greene, JP. & Mellow, N. (1998) Integration where it counts: a study of racial integration in 
 public and private school lunchrooms. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
 American Political Science Association. Retrieved 
 from https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED428992.  
Greene, JP., Mellow, N. & Giammo, J. (1999) Private schools and the public good: the effect of 
 private education on political participation and tolerance in the Texas poll. Journal of 
 Catholic Education 2, 429–443.  
Haidt, J. (2012) The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New 
 York: Vintage  Books.  
Hajnal, Z. (2015) Where does America’s low voter turnout matter the most? In local elections. 
 The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
 cage/wp/2015/03/24/where-does-americas-low-voter-turnout-matter-the-most-in-
 local-elections/?utm_term=.2f0f60b41c0c  
Hamilton, JC. (1879) Life of Alexander Hamilton. A history of the republic of the United States of 
 America, as traced in his writings and those of his contemporaries, vol 3.  
Hanmer, M., Banks, A. & White, I. (2014) Experiments to reduce the over-reporting of voting: a 
 pipeline to truth. Political Analysis 22, 130–141.  
Henderson, J. & Chatfield, S. (2011) Who matches? Propensity score and bias in the causal 
 effects of education on participation. Journal of Politics 73, 646–658.  
Lerner, R. Nagai, A. & Rothman, S. (1995). Molding the good citizen: The politics of high school 
 history texts. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. 
Loewen, P., Cochrane, C & Arensault, G. (2017) Empathy and Political Preferences. Princeton, 
 NJ: Princeton  University Press.  
Lyons, L. (2005) Teens Stay True to Parents’ Political Perspectives. Gallup. Available  
 at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/14515/teens-stay-true-parents-political-
 perspectives.aspx  
McDonald, M (2003). On the over-report bias of the national election survey. Political Analysis 
 11, 180–186.  
Maniam, S. & Smith, S. (2017) A Wider Partisan and Ideological Gap between Younger, Older 
 Generations. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.  
Martinez, M. (2003). Comment on voter turnout and the national election studies. Political 
 Analysis 11, 187–192.  
Mayer, A. (2011) Does education increase political participation? The Journal of Politics  
  73(3), 633–645.  
37 
 
Meltzer, A. & Richard, S. (1983) Tests of a rational theory of the size of government. Public 
 Choice 41(3): 403–418.  
Miller, L. (2015) Can racism be stopped in the third grade? New York Magazine. Available 
 at: http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2015/05/can-fieldston-un-teach-racism.html  
Paterson, F. (2000). Building a conservative base: teaching history and civics in voucher- 
 supported schools. Phi Delta Kappan 82(2), 150–155.  
Purdum, T. (2000). Counting the vote: the overview; Bush is declared winner in Florida, but 
 Gore vows to contest results. The New York Times. Available 
 at: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/27/us/counting-vote-overview-bush-declared-
 winner-florida-but-gore-vows-contest.html  
Reardon, S. & Yun, J. (2003) Private School Racial Enrollments and Segregation. New 
 York: Century  Foundation Press.  
Rogers, T. & Aida, M. (2012) Why bother asking? The limited value of self-reported vote 
 intention. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP12-001 (January), John F. 
 Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  
Schofield, J. & Hausmann, L. (2004) The conundrum of school desegregation: positive student 
 outcomes and waning support. University of Pittsburgh Law Review 66(1), 83–111.  
Segar, M (2017). Betsy Devos is coming for your public schools. Newsweek. Available  
 at: http://www.newsweek.com/betsy-devos-trump-education-department-538533. 
Sikkink, D. (2013). The hidden civic lessons of public and private schools. Catholic Education: A 
 Journal of Inquiry and Practice 7(3), 339–365.  
Smith, C. & Sikkink, D (1999). Is private schooling privatizing? First Things 92, 16–20.  
Stephan, WG. & Rosenfield, D. (1978) Effects of desegregation on racial attitudes. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology 36(8), 795–804.  
Wells, A. & Crain, R. (1994) Perpetuation theory and the long-term effects of school 
 desegregation. Review of Educational Research 64, 531–555.  
Wells, A., Holme, J. & Revilla, A. (2009) Both Sides Now: The Story of School Desegregation’s 
 Graduates. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
Zimmerman, J. (2010). American history - - right and left. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from 
 https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-17-la-oe-zimmerman17-
 2010mar17-story.html 
38 
 
Appendix6 
 
 
                                                          
6 For all tables, *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
39 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
  
41 
 
 
  
42 
 
 
  
43 
 
 
  
44 
 
 
  
45 
 
 
  
46 
 
 
  
47 
 
 
  
48 
 
Chapter Two 
Making sense of low private returns to education in the Arab World 
Motivation 
Several scholars and media outlets have identified the low rate of return to education in 
the Arab World as a root cause of unrest and upheaval (Fargues, 2011; Adams & Wintrhop, 
2011;Rhoads & Liu, 2009; Shafiq & Vignoles, 2015 ). Yet, a closer inspection of literature reveals 
that the theoretical or practical understanding of why returns in the region are so low remains 
under-researched, with some exceptions (e.g. Tzannatos et. al. 2016). This paper aims to begin 
filling that void by empirically examining the association between four salient features of Arab 
World political economy and returns to education. Specifically, I examine the association of 
returns with religiosity, natural resource reliance, school quality, and corruption. My findings 
are not causal, nor are they exhaustive or conclusive. Rather, they are suggestive, and hopefully 
intriguing. It is my hope that this analysis might serve as a roadmap for those who might drill 
down into an understudied regional issue with global consequences. 
 
Background 
On the morning of December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi set out on the streets of 
Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, to peddle produce just as he had done for the past seven years. What 
transpired that day – harassment, abuse, shutdown at the hands of local law enforcement 
(ostensibly for failing to carry a permit), and Bouazizi’s resultant self-immolation in front of the 
municipal building – proved to have global consequences (Abouzeid, 2011). As video of the 
event spread on social media, protests erupted in Sidi Bouzid and within weeks engulfed the 
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Arab World, from the Western Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Regimes toppled with 
millions displaced. Hundreds of thousands were killed as protests gave way to insurgency in 
Libya, Iraq and Syria. 
Pundits took to the airwaves to explain what factors other than the immediate catalyst 
had precipitated the wave of revolutions, routinely identifying both political factors (i.e. 
government repression and corruption) and economic factors, namely a lack of opportunity. 
Simply put, Arab laborers, including well-educated ones, perceived limited opportunities for 
upward mobility (World Bank, 2015; Mazarei & Mirzoev, 2015). The accuracy of the low 
opportunity hypothesis rests upon one or more of three assumptions as they relate to 
education: that access to education is constrained, that education systems are failing to deliver 
leverageable skills, or that characteristics of political economy suppress returns to education. 
Given that access to education and attainment have increased dramatically in the region over 
the past four decades (Barro & Lee, 2000; Young, 2016) and that the Middle East has the 
highest skilled emigration rate in the world (Ahad and Tzannatos, 2016), characteristics of 
political economy appear determinant vis-à-vis the perception of limited opportunity.  
 
Review of Literature 
 While there is abundant literature relaying the frustration of the region’s middle class 
there is only a scant literature that attempts to understand the problem through the lens of 
human capital theory. Ahad and Tzannatos (2016) offer a cursory introduction to the topic, 
elucidating that part of the low returns in the Gulf countries might be explained by the 
preponderance of foreign labor. Expatriates occupy most lucrative jobs in the private sector 
50 
 
thereby pushing citizens into the comparatively wage-compressed public sector, where 
promotion is rarely meritocratic. In short, those measured to evaluate national returns to 
education are largely confined to a sector that does not properly reward human capital. 
 Ahad and Tzannatos (2016) hypothesize that the observance of low returns is not only a 
function of who is entering countries, but also who is leaving. Indeed, Arab states may suffer 
from the highest skilled emigration rate in the world. While emigrating individuals might be 
frustrated with the lack of opportunity or mobility in their local economy, they likely would 
have been high wage earners, so their departure arithmetically lowers returns. Of course, 
emigration is both a cause and symptoms of low returns. Supply side issues including skill 
mismatches and demand side issues including protectionism and corruption that are forcing 
emigration are suppressing the returns of those who remain behind.  
Pissarides (2005) asserts that the region’s inflated public sector and laborer preference 
for public sector jobs suppresses private and therefore overall returns to education. Specifically, 
preference for the public sector “explains the low skill composition of the private sector and the 
skill mismatches in the region. There is evidence that the distortions in relative wages have 
increased the private rate of return to skill, without a corresponding increase in its social rate of 
return. So although highly-skilled workers who get public sector jobs are rewarded for their 
educational investment, labor productivity in the private sector does not rise to match the 
private rewards.” (p. 4) 
 Other scholars have posited that the low returns to education in the region are not 
limited to earnings. Diwan (2016) finds that the region also suffers from low social and political 
returns. Concisely, “educated Arabs are much less emancipated by their education on political 
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and social values compared to their peers…Emancipation (referring to) a higher preference for 
democracy, more civic action, and a lower preference for patriarchy, authority and social 
conservatism” (p. 1-2). It seems that Arab schools are not only failing to deliver adequate labor 
market outcomes, but also what we would perceive to be desirable social and political 
outcomes. Simply put, the failures and shortcomings of Arab education systems are 
multifaceted.  
Quantifying returns to education 
 Estimated pecuniary returns to education from each country are derived from a simple 
Mincerian equation in which the log of an individual’s earnings are a function of their years of 
education, their experience, and a quadratic term of the latter. Formally,  
ln⁡(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 +⁡𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 +⁡𝛽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖
2 +⁡𝜀𝑖 
The rate of return is sensitive to how education is quantified. While most models use years of 
education, so-called “extended-earnings functions” use level of educational attainment (e.g., a 
high school diploma or bachelor’s degree). The degree to which one specification is preferable 
gets to the heart of a foundational topic in economics: Whether human capital accumulation 
(measured by years of education) or signaling theory (measured by attainment) is more 
determinant of wages. This analysis will utilize both models, as the debate is unsettled 
(Kjelland, 2008). 
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Table One: Returns to Education 
 
Region Primary Secondary Tertiary  Average Returns 
to Schooling 
Middle East 16.0 4.5 10.5 7.3 
High Income 
Economies 
4.9 6.6 11.1 10.0 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
13.6 5.3 14.8 9.4 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
13.9 4.7 10.3 7.4 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
7.8 5.4 15.9 9.2 
South Asia 6.0 5.0 17.3 7.7 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
14.4 10.6 21.0 12.4 
All Economies 11.5 6.8 14.6 9.7 
 
Source: Montenegro & Patrinos (2014) 
 
In examining returns to education in the Arab World, the specification does have 
implications. Montenegro and Patrinos (2014) estimate that the return to schooling in the Arab 
World is 5.6% when using years of education, lagging appreciably behind the rest of the globe. 
However, using attainment shows that primary returns to schooling are not far from the global 
average, but that secondary and tertiary returns lag woefully behind.  
 
Methods and Data 
I examine the relationship between the rate of return to education and several factors 
that might explain the region’s low returns, specifically religiosity, poor academic performance, 
economic reliance on natural resources, and rule of law, measured by corruption and property 
rights. Rate of return estimates come from several different sources. Primarily, I use 
Montenegro and Patrinos’ (2014) Comparable Estimates of Returns to Schooling Around the 
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World. They estimate returns for dozens of countries using a simple Mincer equation. In several 
cases, there are more than a dozen estimates for a single country as they update estimates as 
new waves of data become available. I defer to their most recent estimates.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Montenegro and Patrinos return to education estimates 
 
The Montenegro and Patrinos dataset (2014) has the advantage of including estimates 
for dozens of countries using the same method. Including non-Arab countries in my analysis of 
the relationship between these national characteristics and returns to education is desirable, as 
drawing inference from 22 countries is difficult. Missing data within independent and 
dependent variables further compounds the issue. Importantly, my hypothesis about what 
might be causing the region’s low returns to education are not exclusive to the Arab World. 
Rather, those forces are a particularly salient feature of Arab World political economies.  
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Montenegro and Patrinos (2014) estimate returns to education for only 10 of 22 Arab 
countries, a notable drawback given the purpose of this analysis. I fill this gap with estimates 
from other sources. All estimates derive from basic Mincer equations, so while the sources of 
data are different, the methods to calculate returns to education are the same.   
 
Table Two: Availability of data from Arab states (Cont.) 
 
Country RoR Source 
(simple earnings 
function) 
RoR Source 
(extended 
earnings 
function) 
PISA 
Math 
Score 
% of GDP 
from natural 
resources 
Religiosity 
Index Score 
Corruption 
Index Score 
Algeria Boutayeba, 2017  2011 2015  2016 
Bahrain    2015  2016 
Comoros Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
 2015  2016 
Djibouti Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
 2015  2016 
Egypt Rizk, 2016 Said, 2015  2015 2013 2016 
Iraq Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
 2015 2013 2016 
Jordan Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
2002 2015 2013 2016 
Kuwait Alqattan et al., 
2012 
  2015  2016 
Lebanon Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
 2011 2015 2013 2016 
Libya Arabsheibani, 
2001 
    2016 
Mauritania Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
   2016 
Morocco Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
 2015 2013 2016 
Oman    2015  2016 
Palestinian 
Territories 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
  2015 2013  
Qatar   2011 2015  2016 
Saudi Arabia    2015  2016 
Somalia    2015  2016 
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Table Two: Availability of data from Arab states (Cont.) 
 
Country RoR Source 
(simple earnings 
function) 
RoR Source 
(extended 
earnings 
function) 
PISA 
Math 
Score 
% of GDP 
from natural 
resources 
Religiosity 
Index Score 
Corruption 
Index Score 
Sudan Rizk, 2016 
 
Barouni & 
Broecke, 2014 
 2015  2016 
Syria Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
   2016 
Tunisia Rizk, 2016 Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
2001 2015 2013 2016 
United Arab 
Emirates 
  2015 2015  2016 
Yemen Montenegro and 
Patrinos, 2014 
  2015  2016 
 
There is one notable methodological concern in using non-Arab countries within the 
analysis. Arab states have high levels of religiosity, corruption, inequality and natural resource 
reliance. They also have poorly performing schools and low returns to education. Therefore, 
including non-Arab countries alongside Arab states within a regression increases the likelihood 
of detecting spurious relationships. Illustratively, a correlation between returns to education 
and corruption is likely to find a negative association simply because Arab states have high 
levels of corruption and low returns to education. Whether corruption is actually causing the 
low returns is questionable.  
Using OLS estimates mitigates these concerns but does not dispel them altogether. As a 
sensitivity test (when sufficient data allows for it), I perform a separate analysis that considers 
the relationship between those characteristics and returns to education exclusively in Arab 
states. For that portion of the analysis, simple Mincerian estimates are derived from Tzannatos 
et al. (2016),who estimate the rate of return to education for all 22 Arab countries using recent 
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Gallup data. Note that their estimates cannot be used within the global analysis, as they 
estimate returns for men and women separately whereas Montenegro and Patrinos’ (2014) 
derive a single simple earnings function estimate for each country.  
Unfortunately, no earnings function estimates, no matter how well specified, are precise 
or causal. After all, the decision to procure additional education is not by chance, but associated 
with a number of factors that affect earnings, including conscientiousness, intelligence, and 
perhaps most importantly, socioeconomic background. Moreover, the degree of bias will 
invariably change depending on national context. To illustrate this point, consider a country 
that provides free, highly accessible college education compared to a country in which tertiary 
education is generally reserved for the wealthy or the family of political elites. In the former, 
socioeconomic background will appear in the error term in some capacity, as familial networks 
surely influence the decision to enroll in college and labor market outcomes. In the latter, 
however, the bias might be orders of magnitude larger. In such contexts, returns to education 
could be significantly overestimated.  
The possibility of differences in the degree of bias across countries casts some doubt 
over whether private returns to education in the Arab World are in fact low, as it is possible 
that the low estimates reflect differences in educational access rather than differences in 
returns. However, there is good reason to trust that returns are low. For one, anecdotal and 
empirical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that highly educated individuals in the region are 
plagued by unemployment and underemployment. Indeed, college graduates in Egypt are just 
as likely to be unemployed as those who have not completed elementary school (Kashef, 2014). 
Discontent among college-educated Egyptians is so acute that Egyptian protestors burnt their 
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MBAs and PhDs in front of the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education (Habibi & El-Hamidi, 
2016). Moreover, access and attainment in the Arab World are roughly equivalent to access and 
attainment in other developing nations.  Barro and Lee estimate that in 1995, 64% of Arab 
World inhabitants had received any formal education compared to 61.7% from all developing 
countries and that average educational attainment in the Arab World was 4.98 years whereas 
all developing nations had an average of 4.79 years. Though it remains possible that those who 
access education are different in the Arab World from the rest of the developing world, that the 
Arab World looks like the rest of the developing world in terms of overall educational 
procurement offers some indication that estimated differences in returns are not primarily 
driven by differences in access to education. Finally, research indicates that more sophisticated 
techniques to model returns to education (e.g. regression discontinuity designs) produce similar 
estimates to Mincerian models (Lemieux, 2003). In summation, there is good reason to believe 
that returns to education in the Arab World are in fact low.  
 
Subgroup Effects 
Estimates of returns to education reflect national averages. However, they could vary 
significantly by subgroup. Indeed, returns to education in the Arab World appear to be at least 
3 percentage points higher for women than for men (Montenegro & Patrinos, 2014). The 
region’s traditional gender roles plausibly explain this phenomenon (Ahad & Tzannatos, 2016)); 
women who do pursue education face significant cultural barriers and therefore tend to be of 
high ability or motivation. Moreover, most of the region’s students are segregated by gender 
during their teens, and females appear to have access to higher quality teachers (Ripley, 2017).  
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 Unfortunately, data limitations restrict this analysis to considering unique returns for 
men and women only. Thinking critically, however, there are other subgroups for whom returns 
might be appreciably different from the national average. Alawites in Syria, for example, 
receive preferential treatment for government and security jobs (Oweis, 2011). Meanwhile, the 
millions of Palestinians residing in Jordan and Lebanon face systemic prejudice that might limit 
their ability to leverage education or skill into higher earnings (Toameh, 2012; Monahan, 2015). 
Religious minorities in other countries are similarly afflicted. Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia and 
Christian Copts in Egypt are denied access to certain careers and face little prospect of 
promotion (Clarkson, 2014; (International Labour Office, n.d.), a reality which almost certainly 
suppresses returns to education.  
 
Discussion 
Hypothesis #1: Religious orthodoxy suppresses returns to education 
 One plausible explanation for the region’s low returns that has not been explored in the 
literature is religious (ie Islamic) orthodoxy. Weber (1930) famously posits that faith traditions 
ascribe different values to material wealth and industry. If Islamic religious texts assign low 
priority to or repudiate commercialism, then stricter religious observance might compel citizens 
and governments to favor education systems that deprioritize human capital accumulation. 
More recently, Van Hoorn (2016) uses an epidemiological approach to study cultural factors 
explaining the accumulation of human capital and found compelling evidence that culture 
affects an individuals’ propensity toward human capital accumulation. Political scientist Samuel 
Huntington (1993) famously argues that Islam itself is a culture, “defined by both common 
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objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the 
subjective-self-identification of people.” (p. 23) Practicing Muslims who avow the importance of 
Ummah, or religious community, (al-Ahsan, 1986), may not disagree. However, even if Islam is 
not a culture, it is not farfetched to believe that Islamic faith could influence attitudes towards 
human capital. After all, Islam is an all-encompassing faith that prescribes individual, economic, 
cultural, and moral conventions. 
Islamic theology and practices do potentially help to explain the region’s low returns. 
Chapra (1992) noted: 
“Islam envisages an economic system fundamentally different from the prevailing systems. It has 
its roots in the Shari'ah (Islamic teachings) from which it derives its worldview as well as its goals 
and strategy. The goals of Islam (maqasid alShari'ah), unlike those of the predominantly 
secularist systems of the present-day world, are not primarily materialist. They are rather based 
on its own concepts of human well-being (falah) and good life hayat tayyibah) which give utmost 
importance to brotherhood and socio-economic justice and require a balanced satisfaction of 
both the material and the spiritual needs of all human beings.” (p. 6)  
This worldview could limit returns to education in several ways. If material wealth is in 
fact less important within Islamic societies and Muslims abide by the Quranic belief that 
“resources are for the benefit of all and not just a few” (Qur'an, 2: 29) then perhaps 
individuals are simply less inclined to maximize educational returns. Going further, 
Islamic societies may conceive of education differently. According to Daun and Arjmand 
(2002), “education is a twofold process dealing with the acquisition of external 
knowledge that improves the faith, and the internal realization of intrinsic meaning…a 
way of approaching the absolute values represented by G-d” (p. 214) 
 If the conception of education is in fact different, then logically so too is its 
purpose. Certainly, the assumption that the chief reason to pursue additional education 
is to procure higher earnings might be a Protestant sensibility that does not hold true 
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across the globe. Evidence regarding Arab attitudes toward education is mixed. Diwan 
and Tzannatos (2017) argue that the Arab World is no less materialistic than other 
regions. On the contrary, responses to the World Values Survey indicate that Arabs were 
23 percentage points more likely than the global average to offer an economic 
motivation to education rather than a holistic one, “as if educated Arabs perceive 
education as a ticket to the ‘good life.’” (p. 8)  Conversely, Daun and Arjmand (2002) 
offer strong evidence of different educational motives in relaying that the “goals of post 
elementary education (in the Arab World) are to create experts in, first and foremost, 
Muslim law, the Islamic religion and Arabic language.” (p. 214) Whereas Western 
educational systems focus on maximizing individual earnings and macroeconomic 
growth, the purpose of education systems in at least some Islamic countries appears to 
be altogether different, such that each additional year of school might be conceived of 
as an accumulation of spirituality rather than human capital.   
 
Table Three: Percent of school instructional time allocated toward subjects (Cont.) 
Country Koran 
and 
Islamic 
Studies 
Arabic Foreign 
Languages 
Math Science 
Grades 1-2 
Oman 20 36 0 17 7 
Yemen 28 31 0 17 10 
Egypt 11 36 0 22 7 
Morocco 18 50 0 20 4 
Lebanon 0 26 26 16 6 
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Table Three: Percent of school instructional time allocated toward subjects (Cont.) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
50 - - - - 
Grades 3-4 
Oman 18 27 0 17 10 
Yemen 28 31 0 17 17 
Egypt 10 31 0 20 20 
Morocco 14 25 36 15 15 
Lebanon 0 27 27 17 17 
Grades 5-6 
Oman 17 20 0 17 10 
Yemen 27 30 0 17 10 
Egypt 8 23 0 15 10 
Morocco 15 25 38 16 4 
Lebanon 0 25 28 18 11 
Saudi 
Arabia 
31 30 0 - - 
Source: Daun and Arjmand (2002) 
 
Note that the teaching of Islamic theology comes at the expense of topics that 
would have a greater impact on human capital accumulation, including math, science, 
and foreign language. Consequently, the differences in the purpose of education 
notwithstanding, it is likely that the time spent on religious topics within schools is 
having a direct and negative effect on the accumulation of human capital, and therefore 
on returns to education. In short, it is plausible that Arab students demand education as 
“a ticket to the good life” but that Arab governments have a different vision.  
 Empirically testing the relationship between returns to education and Islamic orthodoxy 
requires the operationalization of the latter.  To do this, I create an index composed of three 
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questions that were included in a Pew 2013 survey, which asked Muslim respondents across 
several nations whether they believe that Sharia is the revealed word of God, whether they are 
in favor of making Sharia the law of the land, and whether the support stoning as punishment 
for adultery. For each country, I add the percentage of respondents who answer affirmatively 
to these questions to generate an index score.  
 To analyze the relationship between religiosity and returns to education I begin with the 
simple model:  
Returns𝑐 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃 +⁡𝜀𝑖 
Where returns are simple earnings function estimates from the Montenegro and Patrinos 
(2014) study, religiosity is the index score and GDP is the country’s per capita gross domestic 
product. I control for GDP in all models to allow for sensible “apples-to-apples comparison.” 
This simple model indicates that a one standard deviation increase on the religiosity index is 
associated with a .045 standard deviation decrease in returns (appendix 1A). The direction of 
the relationship is consistent with my hypothesis, though with only 18 observations it fails to 
meet the threshold of statistical significance.  
 A model that only controls for GDP per capita is surely under-specified. Consequently, 
for all hypotheses I also posit a more robust model that controls for the other economic 
characteristics tested within this analysis, formally, 
 
Returns𝑐 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃 +⁡⁡𝛽3𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐴_𝑀𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑐 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +⁡𝛽5𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 
Whereby PISA math is the country’s average 2015 math PISA score for 15-year-olds, resources 
denotes the percent of the country’s GDP that comes from natural resources, and inequality is 
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their Gini coefficient7, a statistical measure of income inequality values ranging from 0 (perfect 
income equality) to 100 (perfect income inequality). The more sophisticated model flips the 
relationship between returns and religiosity, as a one standard deviation increase in Islamic 
orthodoxy is associated with a .401 standard deviation increase in returns. With only 13 
observations, it fails to meet the threshold of statistical significance. In short, it is difficult to 
make much sense of the association between religiosity and returns to education when the 
latter are simple earnings function estimates.  
 Using the extended earnings function tells a more nuanced story. For the pared down 
model, a one standard deviation increase in religiosity is associated with a -.188 standard 
deviation decrease in returns to primary education, which is not statistically significant. 
Meanwhile, the more sophisticated model estimates that a one standard deviation increase in 
Islamic orthodoxy is associated with a -.610 decrease in returns to primary education, which is 
both practically and statistically significant at the 90% confidence level (appendix 1B). On the 
other hand, the association between secondary and tertiary returns to education and religiosity 
is positive (though not statistically significant) for both variations of the model (appendix 1C & 
1D).  
 Table three might help explain this phenomenon. Students at the primary level spend 
comparatively more time studying Islam and Arabic, which largely focuses on texts from the 
Quran and Hadith rather than modern language skills (Faour, 2012). This comes at the expense 
                                                          
7 Note that I do not hypothesize inequality as a root cause of low returns in the Arab World. However, the Gini 
Coefficient is a good proxy for disparities in access, perhaps the largest potential source of endogeneity. Tertiary 
returns and Gini Coefficients are moderately correlated (r=.542) and a cursory cross-referencing of both lists 
indicates that the countries with the greatest inequality (predominantly in sub-Saharan) Africa have the highest 
returns.     
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of subjects that are more meaningful for human capital accumulation, such as math and 
science. Religious orientation at the primary level is particularly salient in religiously observant 
countries; conservative Saudi Arabia allocates 50% of primary education toward Islamic studies 
while comparatively liberal Lebanon allocates none. Though a low number of observations 
make it difficult to draw strong inference (an issue compounded by the fact that the low 
number of observations preclude analysis limited to the Arab World), these results offer 
cautious evidence that religiosity does not affect individual attitudes toward leveraging human 
capital. However, it may suppress primary returns to education because of how it influences 
curriculum.  
 
Hypothesis #2: The region’s endemically poor-performing schools limit returns to education.  
The notion that educational quality might affect returns to education is not a novel 
concept. Card and Kreuger (1992) posit the notion in some of their seminal work, and Heckman, 
Layne-Farrar and Todd (1995) uncover compelling evidence of a relationship between school 
quality and returns to education. While there is not a consensus (see: Hanushek, 1986), it is 
theoretically and practically sensible that a lower-quality education might limit returns. After 
all, it is not years of educational attainment that capture human capital accumulation, but the 
skills and knowledge that were imparted in those years. If less human capital occurs within Arab 
schools, then insofar as there is a relationship between human capital and earnings, the returns 
from Arab schools will be lower.  
There is no doubt that Arab educational systems are failing. A look at the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) clearly illustrates the issue: Of the ten-
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lowest performing countries in 4th grade mathematics, only Iran is not in the Arab World. 
Results from PISA are not much better. More startling is that high-income economies including 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are among those low performers, 
indicating that the issue is not one of overall development.  
Beyond the time allotted to religious studies, there are several plausible explanations 
for poor performance. Daun and Arjmand note that the two defining characteristics of the 
region’s education systems are religiosity and centralization. The latter may explain poor 
educational outcomes as much as the former. Students and administrators, it would seem, are 
limited in their ability to tailor an education toward the needs of students. At the classroom 
level, teachers are failing to teach the skills or critical thinking that a globalized economy 
demands. Rote memorization remains a common teaching technique and passive student 
performance is the norm (Rindermannet al, 2014). The dean of an internationally recognized 
Saudi Arabian University corroborated that professors generally need about two years to 
expunge their students of a superficial learning mindset (Rinderman et al., 2014).  
The poor quality of education not only manifests itself on international standardized 
tests, but on other measurable later-in-life outcomes. Psychometric intelligence tests indicate 
that the regional average IQ score is about 83, firmly in the “low average” range according to 
Woodcock Johnson parameters (Rinderman et al., 2014). The problem of poor education is so 
acute that some Egyptian employers have articulated a preference for hiring young, non-
diploma holders who have not gone through the technical secondary system (which has a well-
known reputation for poor quality), preferring to train them themselves (Moreno,2012). The 
poor perception of the system underscores one way in which a low-quality education might 
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affect returns to education. Whereas educational credentials generally hold a strong and 
positive signaling value in the West (the GED being a notable exception), the quality of Arab 
education is so poor as to sometimes hold neutral or even negative signaling value, thereby 
depressing returns (Moreno, 2012).  
 To test the relationship between educational quality and returns to education, I begin 
with the simple model:  
Returns𝑐 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐴_𝑀𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑐 +⁡𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃 +⁡𝜀𝑖 
I have selected math scores to operationalize quality because of the common supposition that 
STEM learning has a larger impact on labor market outcomes than other core subjects, such as 
reading. PISA results are preferable to TIMMS results because more countries take the latter 
within a given year.  
Simple earnings function estimates indicate that there is a positive association between 
PISA math scores and returns to education. The pared down model estimates that a one 
standard deviation increase in math scores is associated with a .416 standard deviation increase 
in returns to education when holding GDP constant while the more sophisticated model bumps 
that estimate to .424 standard deviations, all else equal. The former is statistically significant at 
the 99% confidence level and the latter at the 90% confidence level.  
 Unfortunately, extended earnings function estimates do not help to elucidate the story. 
Rather, they obfuscate it. A one standard deviation increase in math scores is associated with a 
-.122 (pared down model) or -.416 (sophisticated model) standard deviation decrease in 
returns, all else equal. Meanwhile, increases at the secondary model are associated with 
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modest increases in returns while the direction of the relationship vis-à-vis tertiary returns is 
sensitive to model specification. None of the results are statistically significant. 
 It is not clear that the quality of K-12 education should affect tertiary returns, so I direct 
my attention to the primary and secondary level. Still, it remains a complicated story. There is 
some indication of a positive relationship at the secondary level, but the direction flips and the 
magnitude of the estimated effect is larger at the primary level. Logically, one expects a positive 
relationship at both levels, especially given that the simple earnings function indicates a large, 
statistically significant effect. Overall, the relationship between K-12 quality and returns to 
education in the Arab World remains classified as “plausible”.  
 
Hypothesis #3: The region’s reliance on natural resource exports limits returns to education. 
 It is not immediately intuitive that natural resource exports might negatively affect 
returns to education. After all, Persian Gulf states have enjoyed staggering macroeconomic 
growth over the past half-century almost entirely because of petroleum exports, and it might 
be expected that this macroeconomic growth would lead to stronger education systems, 
begetting higher returns to education. However, a glance at international standardized test 
scores offers no such evidence: Wealthy Arab countries appear to perform no better than their 
poor neighbors.   
 This may not be a coincidence. It is commonly posited that rentier states- those which 
derive a large portion of their revenue from the rent of natural resources to external clients- 
suffer from a democracy deficit (Gray, 2011; Kuru, , 2014). This deficit is caused by external 
rents enabling governments to self-fund government operations and placate the population 
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with generous social welfare programs, or even lump sum cash transfers (Araji & Mohtadi, 
2014). Consequently, the normal linkages of social contract theory are broken, and 
governments are less accountable to citizens.  
 
Figure 2: Public expenditure on education and natural resource abundance. Reprinted from 
Gylfason, 2001, p. 849. 
 
If it is in fact true that rentierism restricts democratic growth, then it might similarly restrict oil-
funded Arab regimes from providing a quality education for two reasons. First, if the 
government can self-fund operations through an external rent, then the functions of the 
government and personal prosperity of heads of state (who are often dynastic leaders) do not 
rely upon the creation of a middle class possessing strong human capital stock. In short, self-
interested motivation on the part of Arab governments is lacking, and benevolence should not 
be assumed for regimes that rank among the world’s worst offenders of human rights.  
Going further, there may in fact be a disincentive to promote the growth of a knowledgeable, 
modern middle class. Indeed, education is associated with political participation, and some 
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(Campante & Chor, 2012) have even suggested that increases in educational attainment across 
the Arab World contributed to the Arab Spring. If educational quality is similarly related to 
political participation, then deliberately poor education might be a regime survival strategy.  
Rentierism can affect returns to education through another mechanism. Dutch Disease 
is the phenomenon in which resource booms result in currency appreciation, rendering other 
exports less competitive on the global market. If those involved in the production and export of 
other goods experience stagnation or decline in their wages, then that could arithmetically 
lower returns to education, especially if the individuals involved in the production and export of 
those goods have above-average levels of education.  
Finally, low returns might be explained in part by the fact that while rent-seeking 
behavior can augment national coffers, it creates a relatively limited number of jobs (Karl, T. 
2007), many of which are occupied by foreigners (Lindsey, 2010). Whereas a country that 
develops more organically might expect the well-educated to be the greatest beneficiaries of 
growth, that is less clear in rentier states.  
To test the relationship between educational quality and returns to education, I begin 
with the simple earnings function model: 
Returns𝑐 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐 +⁡𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃 +⁡𝜀𝑖  
Whereby resources is the total annual sum of rents from oil, natural gas, coal, minerals and 
forests in 2015 divided by 2015 GDP. This model estimates that a one standard deviation 
increase in natural resources as a share of economic output is associated with a -.122 decrease 
in returns when holding GDP constant. The estimated magnitude falls marginally to -.093 when 
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controlling for property rights, inequality, corruption, and school quality. It balloons to -.524 
when controlling for religiosity, though none of the estimates are statistically significant.   
These estimates are suggestive of an issue, and they become particularly compelling 
when restricted to the Arab World. The simple pared down earnings function estimates that a 
one standard deviation increase in natural resources as a share of economic output is 
associated with a -.538 standard deviation decrease in returns for men and a -.624 standard 
deviation decrease for women when holding GDP constant. Both estimates are statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level.  
Not surprisingly, Arab World estimates indicate that natural resource abundance is 
more detrimental to women. As table four highlights, the oil-rich GGC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) region is the only sub region in which the rate of return to education is higher for men. 
This is plausibly explained by the region’s conservative gender roles and prevailing attitudes 
toward women working in the historically male-dominant oil sector. In Saudi Arabia, for 
example, women are forbidden from working with petroleum derivatives (Arab News, 2016). 
Elsewhere, the relatively few jobs that the industry creates disproportionately go to men who, 
on average, possess lower academic credentials (Young, 2016). 
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Table 4: Rates of return by gender and share of GDP from natural resources 
Country Rate of 
return 
(men) 
Rate of 
return 
(women) 
Natural 
resources as 
share of GDP 
GCC 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2.0% 1.0% 23.4% 
Kuwait 2.0% 3.0% 39.1% 
UAE 3.0% 5.0% 12.0% 
Qatar 5.0% 5.0% 11.3% 
Bahrain 8.0% 7.0% 5.0% 
Oman 9.0% 5.0% 23.0% 
GCC 4.8% 4.4% - 
Middle East 
Syria 1.0% 0.0% - 
Iraq 3.0% 3.0% 28.6% 
Palestine 4.0% 7.0% 0.0% 
Yemen 5.0% 6.0% 2.3% 
Jordan 6.0% 7.0% 1.2% 
Lebanon 7.0% 7.0% 0.0% 
Middle 
East 
4.2% 5.1% - 
North Africa 
Algeria 4.0% 5.0% 12.0% 
Tunisia 5.0% 5.0% 3.0% 
Egypt 5.0% 7.0% 3.9% 
Libya 5.0% 7.0% - 
Morocco 10.0% 13.0% 2.6% 
North 
Africa 
5.9% 7.3% - 
Other 
Comoros 5.0% 7.0% 4.6% 
Mauritania 5.0% 5.0% - 
Sudan 6.0% 7.0% 4.2% 
Somalia 7.0% 6.0% 17.8% 
Djibouti 9.0% 11.0% 0.9% 
Other 6.3% 7.1% - 
Source: Tzannatos et al (2016) 
 Examining the country rankings vis-à-vis natural resource income offers some indication 
why the relationship between natural resources and returns to education might be particularly 
acute in the Arab World. The top of the list features wealthy Arab countries (e.g. Kuwait, Iraq, 
and Saudi Arabia) and Sub-Saharan African countries (DR Congo, Togo, Guinea) that are among 
the poorest in the world. While those Arab states have the wealth to offer generous social 
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welfare programs and can self-fund government operations (in the case of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait), those African states retain a vested interest in human capital growth and middle class 
expansion.  
Extended earning function estimates more-or-less approximate what one might expect 
to see. The relationship between resources and returns is positive at the primary level, mixed 
(i.e. sensitive to model specification) at the secondary level, and negative at the tertiary level. 
While it is difficult to make sense of a positive relationship at the primary level, it makes sense 
that the effect becomes more pronounced with additional years of education, as it will 
disproportionately affect secondary and postsecondary graduates aspiring to become members 
of the middle class. 
Hypothesis #4: Corruption, nepotism, and non-meritocratic government policy (ie rule of law, 
or lack thereof) reduce returns to education. 
 While the region has generally shifted toward economic liberalization in recent decades, 
“reforms have not, on the whole, loosened central control over people’s careers. The only 
change was that under socialist-leaning systems, this control was exercised by governmental 
agencies, while in the recent systems it is exercised by ‘private’ companies run by the ruling 
regimes.” (Ammous & Phelps, 2011) To be sure, there remain vestiges and sensibilities from a 
socialist past that may continue to harm the ability of individuals to leverage human capital. As 
Henley and Ereisha (1987) demonstrate, stifling bureaucracy is clearly visible within the 
Egyptian textile industry. Although it has been an ostensibly free-market enterprise since 
Sadat’s 1974 “open door policy,” it persists with hiring and promotion practices that are not 
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meritocratic, and do not reward skill. These types of practices may help to explain why the Arab 
World has the region’s highest skilled emigration rate (Kawar & Tzannatos, 2013).  
 Similarly, the failure of Arab states to embrace basic democratic norms, particularly 
respect for property rights, might also decrease returns to education. This hypothesis has a 
theoretical underpinning that dates back to Adam Smith, who wrote that “Commerce and 
manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular 
administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession 
of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law” (Irwin, 2014, p. 11) 
Simply put, individuals might be less inclined to procure and leverage human capital if they are 
not assured of the fruits of their labor.  
 Yet another feature of Arab World political economy that might diminish returns to 
education is widespread corruption, defined by Transparency International (2017) as “the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” Whereas unmeritocratic systems of promotion 
might limit the abilities of individuals already situated within an industry to leverage human 
capital into promotion or higher earnings and whereas poor property rights might disincentivize 
the leveraging of human capital, nepotic hiring practices may altogether prevent highly-
educated individuals from finding a suitable job. Moreno’s (2012) corroboration of a young 
Moroccan man that opined “If they don’t know you or your family, they will never trust you 
with a job”, accurately captures the plight of the region’s legions of unemployed college-
educated adults. Startlingly, the problem is so severe that in several Arab states the percentage 
of individuals claiming that “jobs are only given to connected people” surpasses the number 
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who claim that “there are no good jobs available” when asked to identify constraints to getting 
a job (Moreno, 2012).  
 To test these hypotheses I use national property rights scores provided by the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, which is derived from a mix of survey data and 
independent assessments providing a measure of the degree to which a country’s laws protect 
private property. I also use corruption scores (measured by perceived levels of corruption, as 
determined by “expert assessments” and opinion surveys) provided by Transparency 
International.  
 The simple earnings function uncovers mixed evidence for a relationship between 
returns to education and property rights and corruption. Both have a large, positive, statistically 
significant relationship with returns when holding GDP constant (.362 SD increase in returns for 
one SD improvement in property rights and .544 SD increase in returns for one SD 
improvement in corruption score) but are sensitive to model specification. Limiting the sample 
to the Arab World leaves the relationship intact for corruption but casts doubt over the 
importance of property rights. That finding dovetails well with Diwan and Tzannatos’ (2017) 
supposition that Arabs are in fact highly materialistic. In short, poor property rights are not 
enough to deter them from attempting to leverage education as a “ticket to the good life,” but 
corruption poses a serious obstacle to punching the ticket.  
Conclusion 
I have offered some preliminary evidence of how characteristics of Arab World political 
economy explain the region’s endemically low returns to education. If the reasons posited here 
are believed to matter, then it becomes easy to make sense of why returns are so low. After all, 
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surely these factors do not reduce returns in a vacuum, but interact with and compound one 
another as to make the region’s returns approximately half of the international average 
(Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014).  
While the descriptive nature of this work does not allow for much in the way of specific 
policy prescriptions, this research does indicate that returns to education could be improved 
through political democratization, economic diversification, strengthened rule of law, and 
improved educational outcomes. The stakes, of course, are high. Former Dubai Emir Sheikh 
Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum’s foretold that “My grandfather rode a Camel, my father rode a 
Camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son drives a Land Rover, his son will drive a Land Rover, but his 
son will ride a Camel.” (Fosu,2013, p. 492) Pending reforms that reward bright and capable 
entrepreneurs and stem the flow of their emigration, his prophecy looms large.   
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Appendix 
1A.  
Standardized coefficients of global returns 
 to an additional year of education 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
GDP per 
capita 
.740 
(.87) 
-.188 
(-.74) 
-.033 
(-.39) 
-.077 
(-.87) 
-.300** 
(-2.45) 
.158* 
(1.67) 
-.442*** 
(-3.54) 
.301 
(1.16) 
-.187 
(-1.28) 
Natural 
resources as 
% of GDP 
-.524 
(-.90) 
-.093 
(-.66) 
- 
-.122 
(-1.39) 
- - - - - 
Property 
rights 
.457 
(.61) 
-.002 
(-.01) 
- - 
.362*** 
(2.96) 
- - - - 
Gini 
Coefficient 
.079 
(.12) 
.510*** 
(3.44) 
- - - 
.369*** 
(3.92) 
- - - 
Corruption 
index 
-.816 
(-.85) 
.240 
(.89) 
- - - - 
.544*** 
(4.36) 
- - 
Islamic 
orthodoxy 
.401 
(.90) 
- - - - - - 
-.045 
(-.17) 
- 
PISA math 
score 
- 
.424* 
(1.99) 
- - - - -  
.416*** 
(2.85) 
Observations 13 56 140 133 137 123 135 18 60 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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1B. 
Standardized coefficients of global returns to primary education 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
GDP per 
capita 
-.632 
(-1.13) 
.345 
(.53) 
-.261** 
(-2.45) 
-.240** 
(-2.01) 
-.198 
(-1.34) 
--.284** 
(-2.51) 
-.387** 
(-2.44) 
-.025 
(-.08) 
-.091 
(-.21) 
Natural 
resources as 
% of GDP 
.631 
(1.76) 
.113 
(.39) 
- 
.046 
(.40) 
- - - - - 
Property 
rights 
.350 
(.62) 
.379 
(1.04) 
- - 
-.081 
(-.55) 
- - - - 
Gini 
Coefficient 
.248 
(.52) 
-.441 
(-1.45) 
- - - 
-.038 
(-.34) 
- - - 
Corruption 
index 
.161 
(.32) 
-.587 
(-1.56) 
- - - - 
-.184 
(1.16) 
  
Islamic 
orthodoxy 
-.610* 
(-1.99) 
- - - - - - 
-.188 
(-.64) 
- 
PISA math 
score 
- 
-.416 
(-.71) 
- - - - - - 
-.122 
(-.28) 
Observations 13 21 84 79 82 75 81 16 22 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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1C.  
Standardized coefficients of global returns to secondary education 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
GDP per 
capita 
.622 
(1.24) 
-.039 
(-.08) 
-.043 
(-.43) 
-.007 
(-.07) 
-.072 
(-.45) 
-.022 
(-.20) 
-.368** 
(-2.05) 
.442 
(1.73) 
.096 
(.33) 
Natural 
resources as 
% of GDP 
-.400 
(-1.24) 
.246 
(1.10) 
- 
.171 
(1.60) 
- - - - - 
Property 
rights 
-.227 
(-.45) 
-.003 
(-.01) 
- - 
.027 
(.17) 
- - - - 
Gini 
Coefficient 
.753 
(1.75) 
.089 
(.38) 
- - - 
.162 
(1.49) 
- - - 
Corruption 
index 
-.413 
(-.91) 
.116 
(.29) 
- - - - 
.384** 
(2.14) 
- - 
Islamic 
Orthodoxy 
.328 
(1.18) 
- - - - - - 
.228 
(.90) 
- 
PISA math 
score 
- 
.269 
(.79) 
- - - - - - 
.155 
(.53) 
Observations 13 31 93 96 100 92 98 16 33 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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1D.  
Standardized coefficients of global returns to tertiary education 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
GDP per 
capita 
.405 
(.81) 
-.201 
(-.82) 
-.287 
(-3.32) 
-.334*** 
(-3.52) 
-.447*** 
(-3.10) 
-.108 
(-1.25) 
-.486*** 
(-2.94) 
.191 
(.71) 
-.096 
(-.47) 
Natural 
resources as 
% of GDP 
-.509 
(-1.59) 
-.65 
(-.50) 
- 
-.041 
(-.43) 
- - - - - 
Property 
rights 
.307 
(.61) 
-.021 
(-.09) 
- - 
.186 
(1.29) 
- - - - 
Gini 
Coefficient 
.758 
(1.78) 
.644*** 
(4.51) 
- - - 
.499*** 
(5.79) 
- - - 
Corruption 
index 
-.951* 
(-2.12) 
.165 
(.68) 
- - - - 
.226 
(1.36) 
- - 
Islamic 
Orthodoxy 
.301 
(1.10) 
 
- 
- - - - - 
.113 
(.42) 
- 
PISA math 
score 
- 
.048 
(.25) 
- - - - - - 
-.173 
(-.85) 
Observations 13 53 125 119 123 115 121 17 56 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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2A.  
Standardized coefficients of Arab World 
returns to an additional year of education  
 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
GDP per capita 
-1.396 
(-.89) 
-.212 
(-.81) 
-.070 
(-.22) 
-.013 
(-.04) 
.122 
(.27) 
-.695* 
(-2.12) 
Natural 
resources as % 
of GDP 
.696 
(.85) 
- 
-.357 
(-1.14) 
- - - 
Property rights 
-.904 
(-2.36) 
- - 
-.382 
(-1.13) 
- - 
Gini Coefficient 
-.367 
(-.62) 
- - - 
.219 
(.48) 
- 
Corruption 
index 
1.587 
(1.54) 
- - - - 
.660* 
(2.02) 
Observations 7 16 14 15 8 15 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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2B.  
Standardized coefficients of Arab World returns 
to an additional year of education (men only) 
 I II III IV V VI 
GDP Per Capita 
-.950 
(-.53) 
-.330 
(-1.44) 
-.228 
(-1.02) 
-.390 
(-1.15) 
-.890** 
(-2.73) 
-.685* 
(-2.04) 
Natural 
resources as % 
of GDP 
.008 
(.01) 
- 
-.538** 
(-2.40) 
- - - 
Property rights 
-.244 
(-.42) 
- - 
.070 
(.21) 
- - 
Gini Index 
.478 
(.93) 
- - - 
.565 
(1.73) 
- 
Corruption 
index 
.321 
(.50) 
- - - - 
.469 
(1.40) 
Observations 8 19 17 18 9 18 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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2C.  
Standardized coefficients of Arab World returns 
to an additional year of education (women only) 
 I II III IV V VI 
GDP Per Capita 
-.629 
(-.32) 
-.284 
(-1.22) 
-.148 
(-.68) 
-.214 
(-.62) 
-.845** 
(-2.45) 
-.626* 
(-1.82) 
Natural 
resources as % 
of GDP 
-.190 
(-.11) 
- 
-.624** 
(-2.89) 
- - - 
Property rights 
-.291 
(-.46) 
- - 
-.090 
(-.26) 
- - 
Gini Index 
.308 
(.54) 
- - - 
.370 
(1.08) 
- 
Corruption 
index 
.250 
(.36) 
- - - - 
1.39 
(.476) 
Observations 8 19 17 18 9 18 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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Chapter Three 
Haredi education in Israel: Fiscal solutions and practical challenges 
Abstract  
With a fertility rate that nearly triples the national average and increased political power 
that accompanies demographic growth, Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews in Israel are becoming an 
increasingly important piece of the country’s diverse national mosaic. Their growth raises 
economic concerns: Haredi women earn low wages, while most Haredi men do not work (The 
Economist, 2015). Meanwhile, like all Israeli citizens, Haredim receive expensive government 
services, including funding for ultra-Orthodox schools.  
Haredi schools focus on religious instruction at the expense of core subjects, and 
comprise a barrier to economic and social integration. Whether other Israelis should be 
responsible for financing an education that provides limited positive externalities is debatable. 
More importantly, Haredi population growth and attitudes toward work and education might 
jeopardize Israel’s long-term economic outlook (OECD, 2018). Potential policy solutions include 
decentralization of government services, including education, or financial incentives for 
curricular modernization.  
Israel’s Growing Tent 
When Theodor Herzl laid out his vision for the global Jewish diaspora to return to the 
land of Zion, he was equivocal about the state’s secular nature. His model state was to be built 
and inhabited by the “New Jew…that would serve as a corrective to the image of the Diaspora 
Jew as weak, timid and afraid. The new Zionist Jew would be strong, confident and effective.” 
(Firestone, 2012). Consequently, these Jews would shun the religious lifestyle which had failed 
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to protect the Jewish community from wanton violence and oppression in Europe. Whereas the 
old Jew studied Torah, the new Jew would study engineering. Instead of spending the day in 
prayer, the new Jew would spend the day working the land. 
  This imagery persisted among most Zionist organizations through the decades following 
Herzl’s death. However, the Holocaust marked a notable turning point. For one, it fomented a 
paradigm shift within the European Orthodox community. Whereas many Orthodox Jews had 
previously eschewed or altogether opposed a political or diplomatic solution to what was 
supposed to be a divine affair, the atrocities of the Holocaust compelled European Jewry to 
coalesce around the notion of Jewish self-determination (Swirski, Konor & Yecheskel, 1998). 
 The Zionist Movement was from then on a larger tent that would have to accommodate 
the aspirations of the old Jew. Moreover, those who favored the new Jew model were wary 
about impeding the rights or desires of observant coreligionists in the wake of the greatest 
calamity to ever befall the Jewish people. “After the Holocaust, out of guilt and nostalgia, along 
with a sense of moral obligation, Ben-Gurion and his secular comrades understandably felt a 
need to indulge the surviving practitioners of the separatist Judaism that kept Diaspora Jews 
afloat for centuries.” (Schoffman, 2011)  
Although Israel does not have a formal constitution, the rights of observant Jews were 
largely codified by a 1947 status quo agreement that was intended to shore up broad support 
across the Yishuv in anticipation of independence (Stern, 2017). The letter guaranteed that 
certain state practices would be undertaken with deference to Jewish law, including assurances 
that religious school systems would receive educational autonomy. The agreements are 
traditionally upheld as binding.  
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The founders of the Israeli state made a political bargain for which they did not 
anticipate long-term consequences. On the contrary, they imagined that as the desert bloomed, 
so too would the orientation of Israeli Jews; the ultra Orthodox sector would fade away as the 
nation collectively spurned the lifestyle of the shtetl and embraced secular nationalism (Gordis, 
2016).  
Why Predictions Proved Wrong 
Predictions proved wrong for several reasons. First, the status quo agreement was 
reached at a time when the Yishuv was primarily comprised of Jewish European refugees. In the 
proceeding decades, Israel underwent massive demographic changes as nearly 700,000 
primarily Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews fled to Israel to escape persecution and violence from Arab 
and Muslim countries. Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews now collectively account for about half of the 
Jewish population in Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Herzl’s vision of the 
secular Zionist state was a vision and an idea for which they were largely not a party to and 
heeded no sense of obligation (Gordis, 2016).  
Perhaps equally importantly, Ben Gurion may have underestimated the insularity of 
Haredi Jews. In Israel, as elsewhere, Haredi Jews exhibit strong patterns of residential self-
segregation (Alfasi, Ashery & Benenson, 2013). Within those segregated communities, they 
tend to handle affairs internally, including legal matters, law enforcement, and education 
(Katzir & Perry-Hazan, 2018). Their educational independence might be a particularly robust 
barrier to societal integration. Referring to their education as “’the flask of pure oil,’ recalling 
the pure oil used to relight the menorah in the Temple after it was liberated during the 
91 
 
Hasmonean revolt,” Haredi society uses schools to “bequeath unadulterated Haredi values to 
the next generation.” (Rabinowitz, 2017)  
Demographic Changes 
The Haredi population hasn’t simply endured: It has thrived. Largely thanks to a fertility 
rate which peaked at 7.5 children per family in 2005, the Haredi sector now accounts for 12 
percent of the Israeli population. Despite a modest decline in fertility rate—it now stands at 6.9 
children per family—population growth models predict that the Haredi sector will account for 
one third of Israeli citizens and forty percent of Israel’s Jewish population by 2065 (Sharon, 
2018). If demographics are destiny, then Israel must prepare for what President Rivlin called the 
“new Israeli order.” (Stern, 2017)  
Israeli Education: History and Organization 
The Israeli state education law was signed in 1953. While it promised to uphold “the 
values of Jewish culture and scientific achievement, love of the homeland and loyalty to the 
State of Israel and the Jewish People,” (Zameret, 1998) it was sparse on details. Rather than 
creating a cohesive, uniform educational system, it created four streams of education: Three for 
Jews (secular, religious, “ultra-orthodox” (Haredi) and one for native Arab speakers (Wolff & 
Breit, 2012). Secular schools, officially called public state schools, offer a curriculum that closely 
resembles other nations of the developed world with the notable exception of instruction in 
“bible study.” The religious schools are somewhat similar, although they draw from a different 
population (namely, Modern Orthodox Jews) and devote more time to bible studies (Wolff & 
Breit, 2012). Arab school curriculum also largely resembles secular schools, with the notable 
exception that the primary language of instruction is Arabic. 
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Table One: Primary school enrollment by sector (%) 
 2000 2015 2020 (Projected) 
Secular 45.5 39 39.4 
Religious 14.5 13.9 14.5 
Haredi 15.4 22.2 23.5 
Arab 24.6 24.9 22.6 
Source: Wolff, 2017, p. 7. 
Haredi schools are markedly different from the other streams. First, it is not a 
monolithic system, but four separate subsystems, including two operated under the auspices of 
predominantly Haredi political parties: Agudat Yisrael and Shas (Zameret, 1998; Rabinowitz, 
2017). Second, Haredi schools enjoy curricular autonomy that empowers them to practice strict 
adherence to Jewish law and custom and rejection of modernity. Rather than learn core 
subjects such as math, English, and foreign language, Haredi boys spend a significant portion of 
the day in prayer and studying Torah. As a former member of the American Hasidic community 
explains 
Education isn’t meant to line up a job; if it did, there wouldn’t be so many 
college graduates in our greater society who are struggling, with college debt to 
boot. One thing I think the Hasidic education gets right is that it exists for the 
sake of learning itself (albeit religious learning), not a means to an end. Whereas 
my twelve-year-old in public school is told that all he does, from start to end, is 
to prepare him for the workforce, Hasidic kids don’t make any connection 
between fifth grade Gemarah and a future job. Secular education has devolved 
into a myth of jobs as the reward for education, and some seem hellbent on 
imposing this myth on Hasidim. But Hasidim have myths of their own, and 
they’re no better or worse. (Vizel, 2018) 
Girls also receive religious instruction, but some of their day is spent studying more traditional 
subjects. Whereas Haredi men are expected to devote their lives to prayer, Haredi women 
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enroll in more traditional classes in preparation for becoming the primary bread-winner (Katzir 
& Perry-Hazan, 2018).  
Haredi Education 
 Enrollment growth in the Haredi sector has largely mirrored broader demographic 
changes in Israeli society. Whereas 6% of Israeli primary school students attended an ultra-
Orthodox school in the 1990s, 25% of Israeli primary students currently attend an ultra-
Orthodox school. Haredi school secondary enrollment is appreciably lower at 10.7% mostly 
owing to the large number of Haredi children who do not continue a formal education past 
primary school (Wolff & Breit, 2012). There are indications that Haredi school enrollment is 
slowing, but further growth is anticipated into the foreseeable future (Grave-Lazi, 2016). 
Students are free to move between educational streams, but only about 2% of students move 
from one stream into another (Wolff & Breit, 2012). 
An education that focuses on religion rather than core subjects likely puts individuals at 
immediate economic disadvantage. Rejection of secular education might be a particularly acute 
problem in Israel. “Military service in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) plays a major role in 
building intellectual discipline, emphasizing achievement, and encouraging creativity and risk-
taking. After youth leave the army they are more mature and career-oriented, become more 
serious in furthering their education, and are perhaps better able to link the practical with the 
theoretical in their studies.” (Wolff & Breit, 2012, p. 5) Haredim, however, are exempted from 
conscription and overwhelmingly avoid military service, thereby rejecting a plausible alternative 
pathway to gainful employment.  
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As the Israeli economy continues to modernize, disparities in education will become 
even more salient. Though Haredi education has scarcely changed in recent decades, “the fact 
that Israel’s economy has evolved in a direction requiring better education and greater skills 
has translated into a declining employment share among Haredi men who are increasingly 
being left behind. Over 80% of them were employed in 1979. By the last decade, this share fell 
to less than 40%.” (Ben-David and Kimhi, 2017, p. 13)  
 There are some indications that Haredi attitudes toward work and education are shifting 
once again. Between 2009 and 2011, male Haredi participation in the labor market grew to 48% 
from below 40% (Wolff & Breit, 2012). Moreover, growth in enrollment in the Haredi sector 
slowed in recent years, likely because of Haredi families opting for a more secular education 
(Cahaner, Malach and Choshen, 2017). More Haredi students are taking matriculation exams; 
the number of girls taking the exams rose from 31% to 51% between 2005 and 2015. Most 
strikingly, Haredi enrollment in the higher education system grew more than ten-fold over the 
past decade (Cahaner, Malach & Choshen, 2017), a phenomenon that may reflect changing 
Haredi sensibilities about the merit of secular studies (Cohen, 2018) amidst government-
imposed austerity measures (Rosenblum, 2012). 
Recent trends in Haredi education are marked by divergence. Despite the dramatic 
increase in college enrollment, Haredi children receive, on average, less education than their 
parents (Taub Center Staff, 2015). Strikingly, the proportion of Haredi men ages 35-54 having 
no more than a primary school education rose from under one-third to nearly half between 
2005-2015 (Taub Center Staff, 2015). The degree to which less education might suppress wages 
among the Haredim is unclear—that so little school instruction is devoted to topics that might 
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lead to gainful employment suggests the effect might be limited—but it is nonetheless a signal 
that shifting attitudes alone may not solve issues of low labor participation rates and low 
wages. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Haredim are responsive to economic 
incentives or disincentives and that policy changes can make a meaningful difference. As the 
Israel Democracy Institute (2017) reports, Haredi employment rates for men and women 
increased through the new millennium before stagnating in 2015 and 2016. “It would seem 
likely that the policies of the current government, which has reduced incentives to enter the 
workforce and increased support for full-time yeshiva students, have played a role in this 
slowdown.” 
Haredi School Funding 
 Haredi schools receive funding from several different sources. The Ministry of 
Education is the largest sponsor of Haredi schools, and allocations from that source are 
supposed to depend upon the percent of core curriculum subjects taught in the school. For 
example, schools in the Independent Education System as well as those affiliated with Ma’ayan 
Hahinuch Hatorani are expected to teach all core curriculum subjects and in return receive 
100% of the per pupil funding provided to state schools. Moreover, per clause 3(c) of the State 
Education Law, “the basic program of a recognized institution will constitute 75 percent of the 
total hours of study in an official educational institution, but the minister is authorized to 
approve percentages different from these, on the condition that the students of the institution 
will attain, according to tests and examinations, the level of achievement that is customary in 
an official educational institution.” (Shiffer, 1999) 57% of Haredi students are enrolled in such 
schools. Recognized but unofficial schools are expected to teach 75% of core curriculum 
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subjects in exchange for 75% of per pupil funding provided to state schools. 17% of Haredi 
students are enrolled in such schools. Exempt schools are mandated to teach 55% of core 
curriculum subjects for 55% of the per pupil funding provided to state schools. About one 
quarter of Haredi students are enrolled in exempt schools (OECD, 2018).  
Schools within the independent stream—those affiliated with Agudath Israel and Shas-- 
also receive support from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, whose support for the system is 
“ostensibly justified by the fact that they train rabbis, religious judges, and other religious 
functionaries.” (Swirski, Konor & Yecheskel, 1998) That justification notwithstanding, it is 
unclear how those allocations are used.  
The ministry indeed employs an array of supervisors, but they are 
representatives of the different Haredi streams. It emerges from conversations 
with workers at the ministry that these supervisors are far from representing the 
Ministry of Education’s stance toward the Haredi institutions; on the contrary, 
their main concern is to prevent, as far as possible, the ministry’s interference in 
the workings of “their” system. Not infrequently, disputes arise between 
supervisors and other officials in the ministry, and sometimes the political 
leaders of the Haredi sector are even called in to prevent, for example, 
enforcement of standards in the area of teacher training. (Shiffer, 1999)  
 
As Swirski et al. (1998) note, “it is reasonable to surmise that at least some of the monies are 
used to cover costs that are not necessarily educational.” 
The budgeting process is not formulaic and rigid but discursive and political. Rather than 
schools receiving what they “need,” they receive whatever money ultra-Orthodox parties can 
secure in the Knesset (Swirski, Konor & Yecheskel, 1998). Money is then doled out to schools on 
a per-capita basis. Information on the Haredi education sector is scarce (Wolff & Breit, 2012) 
and there is little to no data available regarding financing, graduation rates, and demographics 
(Ben-David and Kimhi, 2017).   Opaqueness appears to be by design: Data could be leveraged as 
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the casus belli for those seeking reform either in budgetary allocations or curriculum (Shiffer, 
1999).  
The discursive budgetary process coupled with increasing Haredi political power have 
enabled allocations to the Haredi sector to grow quickly. Between 1980 and 1998, Ministry of 
Religious Affairs allocations for ultra-Orthodox schools and yeshivas increased by more than 
600%. Meanwhile, in the same period appropriations from the Ministry of Education increased 
by 111% for schools affiliated with Agudath Israel and by 305% for schools affiliated with the 
Shas school network (Swirski, Konor & Yecheskel, 1998).  
Note that other education streams often supplement central government 
appropriations. Municipalities provide about 6.8% of total education funding, though that 
number might be appreciably higher in wealthier areas such as Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, private 
funds (ie households, individuals, and non-profits) account for 22.2% of total educational 
expenditures (Wolff & Breit, 2012). As Haredi municipalities are, on average, significantly 
poorer than other Jewish municipalities, they tend to provide little in the way of additional 
funding.  
Policy Challenges 
The Haredi lifestyle and education system poses significant challenges to the Israeli 
state. On one hand, Ben-Gurion allowed rabbis to rebuild yeshivas (religious schools) which had 
been decimated across Europe. Although he dreamed of building a secular state, the exigency 
for coalition-building and the fear of repressing Jewish observance in the wake of the Holocaust 
was at the forefront of the founders’ minds. 
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 On the other hand, the Haredi lifestyle and the education system that propagates it 
poses financial challenges. As an increasingly large share of the population does not participate 
in a formal economy or assumes low-wage jobs, the ratio of welfare contributors to welfare 
recipients threatens to become untenable. The problem is particularly acute in a society that 
offers generous government services, including universal healthcare and financial assistance for 
recent arrivals. A 2009 study predicts that Haredim, who account for approximately 10% of the 
population currently, will account for 27% in 2059. (The Economist, 2015) Currently, “the 
ministry says that 45.7% of Haredi men are in the labor force, far less than the national 
employment rate of 60.4% and lower than for any group except for Arab women. Moreover, 
those who work tend to be low wage earners. Largely owing to growth within the Haredi sector 
and low-earning Arab sector, “a study recently completed by the finance ministry predicts that 
on current trends Israel’s public debt, currently 67% of GDP, will spiral to 170% over the next 50 
years…Israel cannot afford to keep paying them (Haredim) not to work.” (The Economist, 2015) 
The current arrangement has unsurprisingly generated frustration and concern within 
mainstream Israeli society. Non-Haredi Israelis are frustrated that they are taxed to fund a 
school system that offers limited prospects of gainful employment and even actively lobbies 
against it. Indeed, many Haredi rabbis are vociferously opposed to Haredi students taking the 
Bagrut college entrance exam (Chizhik-Goldschmidt, 2017). Moreover, mainstream Israelis are 
worried that they will feel continually squeezed by the growing number of Israeli citizens 
dependent upon state welfare. This squeeze is already felt in education services, where 
austerity measures have resulted in “larger class sizes, fewer weekly class hours, a heavier 
burden on the teacher, a loss of pedagogical flexibility in the schools, a cessation of the trend 
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toward school autonomy and self-management, and fewer resources for advancing 
disadvantaged populations, including the Arab sector.” (Volansky, 2007)  
Policy Solutions 
Should the state intervene to remedy this increasingly unsustainable system? If so, to 
what extent? This is perhaps first and foremost a difficult philosophical question. The regulation 
of religiously orthodox schools poses a challenge for liberal democratic states, requiring “a 
delicate balance between children’s right to adaptable education” that in accordance with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, is “compatible with their cultural affiliations, and their 
right to acceptable education that fosters the development of personality, talents, and mental 
and physical abilities.” (Katzir & Perry-Hazan, 2018) The proper balance must also consider 
“parental rights as well as public interest in democracy and community conflicts regarding the 
adequate balance between these often conflicting rights and interests, such as in the case of 
teaching secular studies in Haredi schools.” (Katzir & Perry-Hazan, 2018)  
The state cannot simply mandate that Haredi schools adopt a more comprehensive 
curriculum geared toward the Bagrut exams. This would be infeasible for two reasons. First, 
Israel prides itself on adherence to democratic principles, and is sensitive to the challenges of 
being both a democratic and Jewish state. Compelling the Haredi sector to change their 
education system would likely not pass muster. Even if such a move were legally possible, it 
would be politically tenuous. Haredi political parties have been a member to recent coalition 
governments, including the current Likud-led government which features both United Torah 
Judaism and Shas within their coalition. The latter is particularly important. As the BBC reports, 
Shas has pledged support to every Labour and Likud government since the party was 
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established in 1984, and is firmly entrenched as a political “kingmaker” (BBC, 2013). Their 
influence has been especially salient in recent months, as opposition to reforms to mandate 
Haredi conscription into the Israeli Defense Forces contributed to the collapse of a Likud 
government in 2019. Notably, education is a core issue for Shas: They have signaled that 
austerity budgets should not impact education, welfare or health services without a reduction 
to the defense budget (BBC, 2013). Their warnings are taken seriously; four coalition crises 
between 2000 and 2012 were due to disagreements regarding Haredi education (Lipshits, 
2015).  
Complicating matters further, any attempt to reform the Haredi education system will 
almost certainly be met not only with political resistance from Haredi parties but broad 
opposition and defiance from Haredi families. The community often laments that their lifestyle 
is under assault from more secular Jews. “It’s why the language they use to discuss this issue 
includes words like meshimed, or a Jew who seeks to hurt his own people, or gezeyrah, an evil 
decree by the government, both loaded and theological.” (Vizel, 2018) Concerningly, even 
internal efforts toward education reform are met with hostility. A Hasidic educator who opened 
a school that teaches Haredi boys math and science has been assaulted and derided as a Haredi 
impostor (Chizhik-Goldschmidt, 2017).  
Still, Israeli society and government should try to address this increasingly untenable 
issue. Israel is, according to national ethos, a nation that was formed from the ashes of the 
Holocaust and, like David versus Goliath, survived against sometimes insurmountable odds 
(Gordis, 2016). Metaphorically, they always choose to go to the moon. 
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One seemingly attractive option is employing a Tiebout model and shifting the primary 
education finance responsibility from the central government to localities, thereby neutering 
the influence of Haredi political parties over education appropriations. This has several 
benefits. First, while the low wages among the growing Haredi sector is the paramount policy 
concern, the financial burden that high-earning Israelis must incur to pay for the government 
services of others could be modestly alleviated. This has both fiscal and philosophical appeal. It 
is not clear that citizens should pay for the education of others when that education appears to 
offer no positive externalities. And whereas Israel spends 7.3% of GDP on education, higher 
than the OECD average (Grave-Lazi, 2014), the financing of Haredi schools is a non-negligible 
expense.8  
Admittedly, this too would be politically difficult. Localized funding would mark a 
betrayal of Israel’s strong collectivist tradition, which has eroded in recent decades but remains 
embedded within Israeli consciousness (The Jewish Agency for Israel, 2015).  More importantly, 
in addition to Haredi parties opposing such a move, the Arab sector would also likely stand in 
opposition, as Israeli Arabs are, on average, significantly less wealthy than Israeli Jews and 
would stand to lose under such an arrangement. Whether any Israeli government could have 
the political capital to draw the ire of both Arabs and Haredim is dubious.    
Another potential reform to encourage Haredi workforce participation is already 
underway.  
In 2013, the Israeli Ministry of Education initiated a reform scheme allowing 
Haredi schools to change their status from private unofficial schools to official 
                                                          
8 It is not clear what percentage of education appropriations go to Haredi schools, as appropriations are not 
uniform between streams (Wolff & Breit, 2012). Ben-David and Kimhi estimate that ultraorthodox schools receive 
about 60% of the funds that would be received by an equivalent mainstream school. Haredi schools comprise 17% 
of the Israeli school system, the majority of those enrolled in a primary school.  
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public schools and affiliate with a new public education stream––the National 
Haredi Education (NHE). The reform was innovative in that it established a new 
stream of governmental schools and was implemented through a radical 
organizational change in the Ministry of Education. In NHE schools, students are 
expected to study a full core curriculum, parallel to that of other public schools. 
The NHE reform provided financial incentives to the Haredi schools who chose to 
affiliate with the public school system. (Katzir & Perry-Hazan, 2018) 
 
The program has received buy-in from the Haredi community and politicians due to 
financial incentives (Katzir & Perry-Hazan, 2018), which Haredim are responsive to despite their 
comparatively low prioritization of material rewards (Perelman, Yaish & Bental, 2019). 
Moreover, Haredi schools transitioning to “public” institutions is a legitimizing process for the 
community and their education system. The future of the NHE is uncertain, as it essentially 
relies upon handshake agreements but has not been codified into law. Whether the NHE will 
persist or become institutionalized remains an open question, but at the very least it provides a 
sensible framework for future reform. It is possible, it seems, to modernize Haredi education 
through democratic processes.  
While this arrangement may demand greater financial allocations to Haredi schools, the 
investment holds the potential to pay for itself many times over. Unfortunately, reformed 
sensibilities is not a foregone conclusion. Scholars have noted that within an American context, 
schools are not social engineering machines so much as institutions that absorb the cultural 
milieu of the area (Meyer, 1977, Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This might be especially true in Israel 
given the four different educational streams. It is possible then that the NHE is an organic 
manifestation of shifting sensibilities among some Haredim rather than a radical social 
engineering project. Whether the Haredi sensibility shift is enduring and to what extent it might 
spread to the rest of the Haredi community is a source of question. Regulation and oversight 
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from the central government will only go so far if the community is not committed to economic 
independence.  
Finally, Haredim could acquire useful technical expertise and refine their noncognitive 
skills through conscription. IDF service often serves a “double career” and gives officers the 
opportunity to network in the private sector. “Officers who are assigned to develop unmanned 
aerial vehicles form relationships with companies like Elbit and Israel Military Industries. 
Ordnance Corps officers maintain connections with IMI; Logistics Corps officers share ties with 
food companies; an officer responsible for the provision and maintenance of military vehicles 
works with leasing companies.” (Shtrasler, 2010) Haredim have historically missed out on such 
opportunities because they were long exempted from military service due to pressure from 
Haredi MPs. Those exemptions may expire in the near future, as disagreement over exemptions 
has become a political tinderbox and contributed to the collapse of previous governments.  
The outcomes of Haredim who have served in the IDF help to inform the potential for 
universal conscription to improve Haredi labor market outcomes. Malchi (n.d.) reports that 
Haredi veterans experience profoundly improved labor market outcomes: 88% of veterans 
enter the workforce within two years of completing military service. By comparison, 24% of 
Haredi men aged 18 to 24 participate in the workforce. Moreover, among Haredi men who 
work, those who served in the IDF earn higher wages. 
American history indicates that the military is a greater engine of social change than 
schooling, as strong sense of institutional mission, diverse demographic composition, 
engagement in combat, and round-the-clock time spent with platoonmates all contribute to the 
erosion of distinctions of race, class, and faith. The social change generated by the IDF should 
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be even greater, as the likelihood of experiencing combat is higher and “the military is both a 
central institution and a dominant cultural force…service is often considered a prerequisite for 
entering adult life and an initiation rite into Israeli-Zionist culture.” (Kaplan & Rosenmann, 
2012, p. 419-436)  
Yet, despite the promise that conscription would appear to hold in ameliorating Haredi 
labor market outcomes, significant change is not a foregone conclusion. The improved 
outcomes of past volunteers offer no guarantees for the success of universal conscription, as 
those who volunteered hold fundamentally different attitudes from their peers. Even among 
Haredim volunteers, service produces tepid changes in attitudes; only 36% report that their 
attitude toward secular Israeli society improved as a result of their service (Malchi, n.d.).  
Conclusion 
 Israel’s long-term economic and democratic vitality is increasingly threatened by 
demographic changes in Israeli society. Education appears to be both an obstacle (insofar as it 
promotes the Haredi lifestyle and impedes gainful employment) and a potential antidote. Policy 
solutions will require democratic deliberation to ensure that the Haredi community buys into 
reform; top-down measures from a state that Haredim already sometimes perceive as 
oppressive is destined to end in failure.  
 The challenges that Haredi education poses for Israel raise universal questions about the 
regulation of publicly financed schools. Although self-interested schooling selections within a 
plural system are generally thought to benefit the common good, Haredi schools in Israel 
expose that an empirical claim about averages can mask significant variance. Future work 
should seek to understand precisely under what conditions school choice can undermine the 
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common good and how regulation might prevent such outcomes without unduly impeding the 
liberty of others.  
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Conclusion 
American public education confronts paradoxical goals. If the purpose of American 
education is to create virtuous, liberty- and equality-loving citizens, then schools should be the 
crucible through which citizens of all backgrounds become proper American citizens. 
Conversely, reverence for liberty should allow families to pursue education in accordance with 
their cultural or religious mores. The Founding Fathers squabbled over whether education 
should reflect liberty or instill it. The dispute was settled as a matter of policy in the 19th 
century when Progressive reformers-- catalyzed by nativist concerns and an authentic desire to 
improve the condition of urban areas—succeeded in their advocacy for the common school. In 
the end, “civic republicanism trumped liberal pluralism.” (Berner, 2017, p. 40)  
Although the common school won out as a matter of policy, it is not without its 
discontents. Some proponents of educational pluralism argue that liberty precedes all other 
principles, so families should have more power to pursue their preferred type of school. Others 
argue that educational pluralism doesn’t harm the common good and might even positively 
contribute to the civic health of a liberal democracy. The studies featured herein inform the 
latter position with studies from the U.S. and around the globe. Chapter one examines the 
association between private schooling and voting behavior, finding that additional private 
schooling has no association with the likelihood of voting, but a negative correlation with 
support for President Trump in the 2016 election. Chapter two explores the root causes of low 
private returns to education in the Middle East and North Africa, ultimately indicting the 
influence of poor school quality, economic reliance on natural resources, and corruption. I 
argue that low returns to education contribute to social unrest, underscoring that centralization 
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does not guarantee the outcomes that the system is intended to propagate. On the other hand, 
chapter three exposes potential drawbacks of pluralism. The Haredi education system in Israel 
is publicly funded, but students plausibly experience minimal civic or private returns to 
education.  
Policy Implications and Limitations  
Each study contains limitations in testing hypotheses. The results from chapters two and 
three are simply descriptive, as the questions asked do not readily lend themselves to causal 
research design. The assertions in chapter three are predicated on an assumption that Haredim 
in Israel experience minimal returns to education, but to date no studies estimate Haredi 
returns to education in Israel or elsewhere.  
policy implications and limitations: lessons from the Arab World 
Causality notwithstanding, there is a practical limit to what can be learned from 
international studies to inform US policy. Arab governments are decidedly more corrupt and 
authoritarian than the US government, so their ambitions for public education are different (ie 
loyalty to the government is an absolute priority). As well, their capacity to support those 
ambitions is comparatively weak, as nepotistic and sectarian practices dominate the public 
service sector (El-Gammal, 2013; Fatafta, 2018), where “the private networks that glue people 
together stem from traditional tribal customs, which allow people in positions to bestow wasta 
(nepotism in Arabic).” (Dixon, Bhuiyan & Üstüner, 2018, p. 761)  
Notably, Islamic or Jewish governments that wish to operate schools as a matter of 
social control perhaps face greater obstacles than majority Christian societies. Whereas Jesus 
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urged his followers to “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” Judaism and Islam are 
both religions of law and do not demand such deference to sovereign governments. 
Consequently, whereas Christian educational institutions might experience friction with the 
government over values and mores, Jewish and Islamic schools run a greater risk of teachings 
that directly violate national laws or government interests. For example, in March 2019, 
Pakistani authorities seized control of 182 Islamic schools which were radicalizing students to 
perpetrate terrorist attacks in neighboring India, elevating the risk of catastrophic armed 
conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations (Reuters, 2019).  
policy implications and limitations: lessons from Israel 
Haredi education in Israel poses a challenging policy dilemma. However, while certain 
populations in the United States do not prioritize material wealth according to cultural custom 
(e.g. Haredim, Amish, Mennonite), such groups represent a tiny portion of the population 
compared to Haredim in Israel. If the United States implemented a pluralistic education system, 
most families would surely pursue schools that they believe would lead to gainful employment. 
Nearly 200 years ago De Tocqueville observed that Americans were more materialistic than 
Europeans (Lawler, 2010). In 2018, more Americans reported finding meaning in money than 
faith, friends, or hobbies (Kessel et al., 2018).  
More importantly, history indicates that proponents of centralized democratic 
education should temper their expectations regarding the degree to which such schooling 
succeeds as a social engineering project. During the Reign of Terror, the Jacobins surveilled 
schools to ensure that teaching was aligned with republican virtues and morality. Successive 
governments also used schools to shape public consciousness, but “these efforts were a 
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complete failure… Parents launched a massive resistance to republican education, sending their 
children instead to alternative and illegal schools that provided religious instruction.” (Glenn, 
1988, p. 15) In the United States, efforts to use the common school to integrate Catholics 
spurred unintended consequences. Once Catholic families felt thwarted in their mostly failed 
attempts to effect change in nominally nondenominational Protestant common schools 
through court action and public protest, many withdrew from the system altogether to 
establish their own institutions (Tyack, 1974).  Ironically, “the Catholic school system, which 
remained a powerful force well into the 1960s, traced its roots to the politics of 19th-century 
backlash against immigration.” (Zeitz, 2015) 
Notably, Hitler and Stalin were both successful in purging religious education, and in the 
former case success occurred despite the initiative conflicting with promises made in the 
Reichskonkordat and direct entreaties from Mussolini (Harrigan, 1966). That Hitler and Stalin 
succeeded where others failed speaks to the extreme coercion and state power required to 
fully reimagine and reinvent the relationship between citizen and government by seizing 
control of the institutions that mediate the relationship between them.  
policy implications and limitations: lessons from the United States 
 Studying the association between private schooling and voting behavior also comes with 
important caveats and limitations. Voting in national elections is an imperfect measure of civic 
engagement, as rational adults may not vote due to the near statistical impossibility that a 
single vote will change the outcome of a national election (Downs, 1957). Indeed, voting 
behavior conveys more about the utility that individuals derive from voting as an act of 
rectitude than it does democratic engagement.  Political self-efficacy—the “feeling that political 
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and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this 
change” (Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954, p. 187) —represents a better measure of civic health, 
as it indicates whether individuals feel that their government is of the people, by the people, 
and for the people.  
Final Takeaways 
 Does educational pluralism inhibit or buttress democracy? Champions of both the 
common school and educational pluralism suggest that there are obvious answers, though they 
reach opposite conclusions. An honest appraisal of the extant literature (including chapter one) 
reveals that, on average, private schools are at least as good if not better than public schools at 
promoting desirable civic outcomes. One potential explanation is that private schools are 
exceptionally good at cultivating proper Americans. Another explanation is that public schools 
are not exceptionally good at it. Chapter two highlights that centralized education can fail—
sometimes spectacularly-- in fulfilling its intended mission.  
 Private schools might be incubators for democracy, but chapter three highlights 
potential limitations of publicly financed, privately operated schools. Haredim in Israel receive 
social services which they have little motivation or capacity to recompense. Consequently, they 
violate the terms of the Israeli social contract, which demands that Jewish citizens make certain 
sacrifices so that the nation may enjoy security and prosperity (Lavi, 2014). Without sensible 
oversight or abandonment of social safety nets (thereby alleviating negative externalities that 
occur because of poor human capital), a pluralistic American education system could enable 
similar breaches of our own social contract, which demands the pursuit of financial 
independence (Butler, 2009).  
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Future Research 
 Voting is an imperfect measure of civic engagement. Future research will explore the 
association between private schooling and political self-efficacy. Moreover, I will seek to 
understand why private schooling was associated with a decreased likelihood of supporting 
President Trump in 2016. It is possible that the finding is a false positive or an aberration. It is 
plausible, however, that private schools are better at instilling democratic values such as 
tolerance (Wolf, 2007), and that adults who attended private schools are more likely to 
repudiate intolerant or undemocratic rhetoric.    
 It would be valuable to conduct surveys in Israel to quantify Haredi returns to education. 
I would examine to what degree (if any) returns vary between Haredi youth in Haredi schools 
versus Haredi youth in other schools. If returns vary greatly, then the estimates could illuminate 
Haredi schools as a policy challenge. If estimated returns are similar, however, then education 
reform is a dubious solution to low Haredi wages.  
 Educational pluralism refers to differences in educational experiences as much as it 
refers to differences in who operates or funds schools. To that end, I am also interested in 
better understanding the conflict between local autonomy versus state or federal government 
control of public schools. Charter schools deserve special interest, as they are publicly funded 
and regulated but independently operated. Charter schools were explicitly established as 
laboratories of innovation, but their ability to innovate is increasingly threatened by tighter 
regulations imposed by states as a quality control measure. In ongoing research with Dr. Robert 
Maranto, we empirically explore how more stringent state regulation undermines local control. 
Specifically, we hypothesize and find evidence to suggest that tighter regulation 
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disproportionately and negatively impacts standalone operators as well as Black and Latino 
would-be charter entrepreneurs.  
Future work will seek to understand the potential costs of discriminatory charter school 
regulation. One strain of that research should focus on academic outcomes. Greater autonomy 
is associated with better educational outcomes, at least in the developed world (Hanushek, Link 
& Woessman, 2012). Taken together with the fact that students perform better with teachers 
who look like themselves (Egalite, Kisida & Winters, 2015; Dee, 2001), it appears plausible that 
regulation that stifles autonomy and community control prevents the establishment of schools 
that would serve their students well, at least from an academic perspective. The other strain of 
research should address differences in civic outcomes as a function of regulation. If a robust 
regulatory regime is required to promote high achievement as proponents ostensibly believe, 
perhaps it is similarly required to ensure that charter schools—institutions in which “the state 
sanctions the pursuit not of the broad common good but of private interests” (Fuller, 2000, p. 20)-- 
produce virtuous, democracy-loving Americans.  
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